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COMMENTS
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE
EMERGING EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN
DATA COMPREHENSIVENESS APPLIED TO
BROWSING HISTORY
DANIEL DE ZAYAS ∗
The third-party doctrine has transcended the shift from analog to digital
technology. Despite judicial cautions that the doctrine is unfit for the digital
age, it persists as one of privacy’s greatest limitations. However, in Carpenter
v. United States, the Supreme Court significantly circumscribed the thirdparty doctrine. Although the Court explicitly limited its holding to historical
cell-site location information, Carpenter paves the way for enhancing
expectations of privacy in many types of data.
This Comment argues that Carpenter applies to browsing history collected
by third-party cookies; therefore, individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their browsing history that is unabridged by the third-party doctrine.
Like historical cell-site location information, browsing history collected by thirdparty cookies is comprehensively detailed and collected involuntarily and
pervasively. In arguing that Carpenter applies beyond the Court’s feeble
restraints, this Comment derives an emerging expectation of privacy in the
comprehensiveness of data from the Court’s repeated focus on how granular
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data can reveal personal information. An expectation of privacy that turns
on the comprehensiveness of data offers new grounds to strengthen privacy
online and in the digital age.
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The internet is the most liberating tool for humanity ever invented, and
also the best for surveillance. It’s not one or the other. It’s both.
—John Perry Barlow 1
INTRODUCTION
When internet users think about their internet profiles, they
typically think about their social media profiles on sites like Facebook
and Twitter. But what about their profiles with online advertising and
marketing companies like Google AdSense and DoubleClick or Acxiom?
These profiles may include information that internet users have shared
publicly, such as their age and sex,2 but may also contain information
that internet users have never shared nor wished to share, such as
political affiliations, religious beliefs, or sexual orientation. 3 What feeds
these databases? The answer is short and sweet: cookies.4 Specifically,
tracking cookies5 allow third-party companies without any direct
relation to internet users to collect, inter alia, internet users’ browsing
history to ascertain or infer information about them. 6
Although these profiles and databases serve legitimate purposes for
internet advertising, 7 they raise significant privacy concerns because
1. James Ball, Hacktivists in the Frontline Battle for the Internet, GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2012,
8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/20/ hacktivists-battleinternet [https://perma.cc/XCR9-WKWJ].
2. ALEECIA M. MCDONALD & LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, BELIEFS AND BEHAVIORS:
INTERNET USERS’ UNDERSTANDING OF BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 9–10 (2010), http://
aleecia.com/authors-drafts/tprc-behav-AV.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWD5-P6LJ].
3. See infra notes 39, 42–45 and accompanying text (explaining how Facebook
“Like” buttons can be used to infer information).
4. A cookie is a small text file that an internet user’s internet browser or software program
saves to the user’s computer. TOBY MENDEL ET AL., GLOBAL SURVEY ON INTERNET PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 14 (2012); Online Tracking, FTC CONSUMER INFO.,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0042-online-tracking#understanding_cookies
[https://perma.cc/X978-RRFQ] [hereinafter Online Tracking].
5. Throughout this Comment, “tracking cookie” refers specifically to third-party
tracking cookies. See infra Section II.A (distinguishing first-party cookies and thirdparty cookies); see also FRANZISKA ROESNER ET AL., DETECTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST
THIRD-PARTY TRACKING ON THE WEB 7 3–4 (2012) (noting that a tracking cookie can be a
first-party or third-party cookie depending on what website the user is currently accessing).
6. See infra notes 35–45 and accompanying text (explaining how third-party
advertising companies and data brokers use third-party cookies).
7. See, e.g., Sophie C. Boerman et al., Online Behavioral Advertising: A Literature
Review and Research Agenda, 46 J. ADVERT. 363, 363 (2017) (noting that monitoring
and collecting internet users’ online behavior allows advertisers to solicit individually
targeted advertisements to optimize a business’s returns on digital advertisements);
Google
Analytics
Cookie
Usage
on
Websites,
GOOGLE,
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they become “one-stop shops” for the government to mine internet
users’ browsing history and other personal information. 8 Internet
users and companies are legally restrained and financially
disincentivized from challenging these government practices,
marring the privacy landscape with a void of privacy protections. 9
Generally, the government must obtain a search warrant to acquire
the contents of electronic communications; 10 however, the same
requirement does not apply to browsing history collected by tracking
https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/cookieusage?hl=en [https://perma.cc/NSS9-LT3A] (last updated Aug. 9, 2018) (noting
that first-party cookies identify new users, count user re-visits, log which sites visitors
come from, and track how long they use a website). But see Robert Heaton, How Does
Online Tracking Actually Work?, ROBERT HEATON (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://robertheaton.com/2017/11/20/how-does-online-tracking-actually-work
[https://perma.cc/W38B-6MVQ] (arguing that cookies are unnecessary because
website server logs generate the same information).
8. Ashkan Soltani et al., NSA Uses Google Cookies to Pinpoint Targets for Hacking,
WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-forhacking/?utm_term=.5364b200ccbe [https://perma.cc/9YMV-RPWZ] (“‘[W]e need
to track everyone for advertising’ translates into the government being able to track
everyone everywhere.” (quoting Chris Hoofnagle, Professor, University of California
Berkeley School of Law)).
9. See Jennifer Daskal, Notice and Standing in the Fourth Amendment: Searches of
Personal Data, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 437, 439–41 (2017) (observing that the
government may delay notifying an individual that his information has been
searched, as well as obtain a gag order to enjoin third-party providers from notifying
the individual); EU “e-Evidence” Proposals Turn Service Providers into Judicial Authorities,
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://edri.org/eu-e-evidence-proposals-turn-service-providersinto-judicial-authorities [https://perma.cc/WEL7-XRAL] (highlighting that
companies, unlike states, are not legally obligated to defend individuals’ privacy
rights); Eleni Kyriades, Digital Free for All Part Deux: European Commission Proposal on
E-Evidence, JUST SECURITY (May 17, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/56408/
digital-free-part-deux-european-commission-proposal-e-evidence
[https://perma.cc/NY47-WGWD] (noting that companies are not economically
incentivized to protect individuals’ privacy rights). A recent study highlights the
vulnerability of internet users’ privacy, reporting that 45% of the 600 websites
analyzed did not require the government to obtain a subpoena or warrant before
disclosing users’ personally identifiable information. RAZIEH NOKHBEH ZAEEM & K.
SUZANNE BARBER, A STUDY OF WEB PRIVACY POLICIES ACROSS INDUSTRIES 10 (2018).
10. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a)
(2012) (prescribing that any “person or entity providing an electronic
communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of
any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof)
while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee
or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended
recipient”); see also In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2014)
(interpreting “content” under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) as excluding browsing history).
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cookies and possessed by third-party companies. 11 This discrepancy
can be attributed to the third-party doctrine, which mandates that a
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily conveyed to third-parties. 12 Courts developed
the third-party doctrine in a series of cases during the age of analog
technology and left it almost undisturbed as society transitioned into
the modern digital age.13 However, scholars, Supreme Court Justices,
and even the attorney who successfully argued a seminal third-party
doctrine case, have questioned the doctrine’s viability in the digital age.14
On June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court loosened the third-party
doctrine’s antiquated grasp over the digital-age when it decided
Carpenter v. United States, 15 declining to extend the third-party doctrine
to a phone user’s historical cell-site location information (“CSLI”)
conveyed to third-party cell-phone providers. 16 The Court denoted
historical CSLI as a “distinct category of information” in which phone
users enjoy an unabridged expectation of privacy and recognized that
historical CSLI is not voluntarily conveyed to cell-phone providers. 17

11. See infra Section II.C.2 (identifying the privacy frameworks applicable to
browsing history and tracking cookies).
12. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that even if one
exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a
third party, such an expectation “is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))).
13. Infra Section II.B.2.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (advancing that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age”);
Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and
Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2009) (scrutinizing several justifications and
explanations of the third-party doctrine and suggesting a reconceptualized thirdparty doctrine that requires the government to obtain a warrant to access an
individual’s private disclosures to a third-party); Stephen H. Sachs, The Supreme Court’s
Privacy
Precedent
Is
Outdated,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
26,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-courts-privacy-precedentis-outdated/2017/11/26/fe9d1dd0-cfb2-11e7-81bcc55a220c8cbe_story.html?utm_term=.0c0f9658495a
[https://perma.cc/7XVHTTUY] (statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Counsel for Maryland, Smith v. Maryland)
(stating that “[Smith v. Maryland] has long since outlived its suitability as precedent” and
that “no one involved in the case could foresee the digital revolution that was to come”).
15. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), rev’g 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).
16. Id. at 2217 n.3, 2219 (holding that the government must obtain a search
warrant to access seven days of historical CSLI).
17. Id. at 2219.
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Despite the Court’s monumental decision, its broad reasoning left
several questions unanswered—including the decision’s true scope. 18
This Comment argues that courts should interpret the holding in
Carpenter v. United States to require the government to obtain a warrant
before acquiring browsing history collected by tracking cookies
because internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
browsing history, and browsing history is not subject to a reduced
expectation of privacy nor voluntarily conveyed by tracking cookies.
Part I.A explains the nuances and functions of cookies, and Part I.B
highlights practical concerns about tracking cookies. 19 Part II.A.1
briefly surveys various conceptualizations of privacy before Part II.A.2
reviews the evolution of the Fourth Amendment, specifically from its
early precepts to recent technology-oriented jurisprudence. 20 Parts
II.B–C delineate how the misplaced trust doctrine influenced the
third-party doctrine and identifies how the third-party doctrine limits
privacy interests online.21 Next, Parts II.D–E unpack Carpenter v. United
States and its implications, positing that the Court’s reasoning indicates
that Carpenter’s scope reaches far beyond its limited holding.22 Part III.A
draws upon technology-oriented Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
advance an emerging expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness
of the information sought and illustrates how this expectation remedies
complex, nuanced, and inadequate privacy frameworks while affording
privacy interests to browsing history. 23 Part III.B.1–2 argues that the
third-party doctrine does not apply to browsing history collected by
tracking cookies. 24 Finally, Part III.C recommends interpreting the
third-party doctrine more closely to its misplaced trust doctrinal roots
to inhibit the government from appropriating the private sector for
retrospective information and to reform the third-party doctrine. 25
This Comment concludes that courts should interpret Carpenter as
rendering the third-party doctrine inapplicable to browsing history
collected by tracking cookies to revitalize Fourth Amendment
protections in the digital age.

18. Infra Section II.E (highlighting how courts have navigated applications of the
third-party doctrine post-Carpenter to other types of data beyond historical CSLI).
19. Infra Sections II.A; II.B.
20. Infra Section II.A.1–2.
21. Infra Section II.B–C.
22. Infra Section II.D–E.
23. Infra Section III.A.
24. Infra Section III.B.1–2.
25. Infra Section III.C.
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I. WHAT ARE COOKIES AND ONLINE PROFILING?
Strengthening online privacy rights first requires identifying and
understanding how information is collected online. The following
sections explain how internet users encounter and acquire cookies
and proceeds to distinguish between distinct types of cookies. Not
every cookie threatens internet users’ privacy; in fact, many cookies
provide benign conveniences that facilitate online activity.
Understanding cookies will help identify when and how cookies
hinder internet users’ control over their personal information.
A. Cookies and Online Tracking
A cookie is a small text file that an internet user’s internet browser
or software program saves to the internet user’s computer. 26
Generally, an internet user’s browser acquires cookies during the
technological exchange between the user’s browser and a webpage that the
user directs the browser to access. When a user attempts to access a
webpage, the user’s browser sends the website’s server a message, called a
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”) request, asking the server to provide
the content of the webpage for the user’s browser to load, thus providing
“access” to the webpage.27 While providing the requested content, the
website’s server also provides “any cookies it would like [the user’s] browser
to have,” which are stored in a cookie file in the user’s browser.28 Each
cookie generates a unique ID number for the user and records the website
to which the cookie belongs. 29 When the user revisits the website, the
user’s browser attaches the cookies to every future HTTP request the
browser makes to the website. 30
There are three main types of cookies: first-party cookies, third-party
cookies (tracking cookies),31 and Flash cookies. In 1994, Netscape
engineer Lou Montulli invented the first-party cookie—a cookie
26. MENDEL ET AL., supra note 4; Online Tracking, supra note 4.
27. Heaton, supra note 7.
28. Marshall Brain, How Internet Cookies Work: How Do Web Sites Use Cookies?,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer.howstuffworks.com/cookie3.htm [https://
perma.cc/RA39-EY7J]; Heaton, supra note 7.
29. Heaton, supra note 7; see also What Information Is in a Cookie?,
ALLABOUTCOOKIES.ORG, http://www.allaboutcookies.org/cookies/what-information
-in-cookie.html [https://perma.cc/M9T8-6DMT] (noting that cookies containing
personal identifying information are generally encrypted for protection).
30. Heaton, supra note 7.
31. First- and third-party cookies are both technically Hypertext Markup
Language (HTML) cookies. PETER SWIRE & DEBRAE KENNEDY-MAYO, U.S. PRIVATESECTOR PRIVACY: LAW AND PRACTICE FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS 119
(Julia Homer ed., 2d ed. 2018).
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placed on a computer from the website visited 32—to give e-commerce
stores the personal touch they lacked compared to real stores. 33 Firstparty cookies allow a website to remember a user’s name, login
information, preferences, and items in an online shopping cart. 34
Third-party cookies are cookies belonging to a website other than
the website the user is currently accessing. 35 Infamously known as
“tracking cookies,” companies without any direct relationship to an
internet user, such as advertising companies or web analytic firms, use
these cookies to monitor users’ browsing history across different
websites. 36 By placing their tracking cookies on websites within their
advertising network, these companies can track internet users across
websites and record their browsing history. 37 Companies then use this
information to identify a user’s interests and to tailor advertisements
to those interests, ultimately enhancing the likelihood that a user will
purchase a good or service, and consequently increasing revenue for
advertisers and advertisement publishers. 38
32. ROESNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–4.
33. See Solveig Singleton, How Cookie-Gate Crumbles, CATO INST. (July 11, 2000),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-cookiegate-crumbles
[https://perma.cc/5PDW-7AJS] (stating that, without information about visitors,
websites view return customers as anonymous strangers); see also Viktor MayerSchönberger, Demystifying Lessig, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 713, 741 (positing that the original
cookies were invented to remedy short-term, single session problems like website
“statelessness” and lack of personalization, as well as to facilitate voting).
34. Online Tracking, supra note 4.
35. ROESNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
36. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse,
6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 276 (2012); Benjamin Strauss, Online Tracking: Can the
Free Market Create Choice Where None Exists?, 13 CHIC.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 539, 541
(2014); see ROESNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that “tracker” cookie is more
technically accurate because “a given cookie can be considered a first-party or a thirdparty cookie depending on the current browsing context”).
37. GERTJAN FRANKEN ET AL., WHO LEFT OPEN THE COOKIE JAR? A COMPREHENSIVE
EVALUATION OF THIRD-PARTY COOKIE POLICIES 153 (2018).
38. See Back to the Basics: What is Behavioral Targeting?, LOTAME (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.lotame.com/what-is-behavioral-targeting
[https://perma.cc/BM6CAZEY] (explaining how targeted advertising, or “behavioral advertising,” benefits the
advertising technology industry and consumers); see also J. HOWARD BEALES & JEFFREY
A. EISENACH, NAVIGANT ECONS., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
SHARING IN THE MARKET FOR ONLINE CONTENT 1, 8–9 (2014), http://images.politico
.com/global/2014/02/09/beales_eisenach_daa_study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HGW-YUMG] (concluding that advertisers may pay
advertisement publishers 200% more to deliver a tailored advertisement to a user).
But see VERONICA MAROTTA ET AL., ONLINE TRACKING AND PUBLISHERS’ REVENUES: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 20, 27 (forthcoming 2019), https://weis2019.econinfosec.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2019/05/WEIS_2019_paper_38.pdf
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Generally, an internet user acquires a tracking cookie without ever
visiting the third-party’s website. For example, when an internet user
visits a website featuring a Facebook “Like” button, tracking cookies
embedded in the button automatically prompt Facebook’s servers to
check whether the user’s HTTP request contains its tracking cookie. 39
If the request does not contain Facebook’s tracking cookie, the user’s
browser saves a new tracking cookie on the user’s computer, and
Facebook creates an advertising profile for the user.40 When the internet
user next submits an HTTP request to that website or another website
featuring Facebook tracking cookies, Facebook’s server recognizes
the user’s tracking cookie and records the user’s browsing history in
its profile of the user. 41
After recording the user’s browsing history, companies analyze the
data to ascertain or infer personal information, such as the user’s age,
sex, sexual orientation, physical location, occupation, educational
level, and interests, to supplement the user’s profile. 42 These
seemingly innocuous individual inferences gradually paint detailed
profiles about users. 43 Companies may also infer personal
[https://perma.cc/4DNH-BHMG] (challenging the economic efficacy of behavioral
tracking and reporting that behavioral advertising increases advertisement
publishers’ revenues by 4% per advertisement).
39. See Daniel Kahn Gillmore, Facebook Is Tracking Me Even Though I’m Not on
Facebook, ACLU (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/
internet-privacy/facebook-tracking-me-even-though-im-not-facebook
[https://perma.cc/5AER-8DPC] (noting that a Facebook “Like” button on another
website enables Facebook to record the website on which a user encountered the
“Like” button as well as additional browsing history); see also Facebook, Social Media
Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data, Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transport. and the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 115th Cong. 23 (2018),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/HHRG-115-IF00Wstate-ZuckerbergM-20180411.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T6A-6UH7] (statement of
Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook) (disclosing that, in addition to the “Like” button,
the Facebook “Share” button, which is embedded on 931,000 non-Facebook websites,
also sets tracking cookies).
40. Gillmore, supra note 37.
41. Id.
42. MCDONALD & CRANOR, supra note 2, at 2; see Michal Kosinski et al., Private
Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802, 5803 (2013) (reporting that, by analyzing participants’
Facebook “Likes,” researchers correctly discerned 88% of the participants’ sexual
orientation and 85% of participants’ political associations).
43. See FTC, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 46,
48–49 (2014) (acknowledging that data brokers collect, analyze, and utilize
information about an internet user to create valuable, “detailed composite[s] of the
consumer’s life”); Soltani et al., supra note 8 (reporting that the NSA has used cookies
to identify and target a suspect for remote hacking).
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information and associations that an internet user has not otherwise
shared by cross-referencing their compiled user profiles with
information from other companies. 44
Most consumers are unaware of these data practices;45 however,
websites are increasingly notifying internet users about their cookie
practices, as well as requiring them to “opt-in,” to comply with the recently
implemented General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).46
Finally, Flash cookies, referring to Adobe Flash Player, are special
cookies that regenerate deleted tracking cookies. 47 Flash cookies are
saved in a location separate from tracking cookies, 48 shielding Flash

44. EMILEE RADER, AWARENESS OF BEHAVIOR TRACKING AND INFORMATION PRIVACY
CONCERN IN FACEBOOK AND GOOGLE 59 (2014); see Charles Duhigg, How Companies
Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.
com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/64JU-W572]
(recalling that Target marketing employees asked a Target statistician, “If we wanted to
figure out if a customer is pregnant, even if she didn’t want us to know, can you do that?”).
45. FTC, supra note 43, at 46.
46. Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679, pmbl., of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L
119) ¶ 1, ¶ 32 [hereinafter GDPR] (requiring websites to give clear, concise, and
non-disruptive notice and to receive affirmative and unambiguous consent from an
internet user before collecting “personal data” about the internet user). Under the
GDPR, “personal data” refers to, in relevant part, any information about an identifiable
natural person who may be directly or indirectly identified by an identification number
or online identifier. Id. art. 4, ¶ 1. The GDPR explicitly recognizes “cookie identifiers”
under the “personal data” umbrella, noting that cookie identifiers “may be used to create
profiles of the natural persons and identify them.” Id. pmbl. ¶ 30.
47. Elspeth A. Brotherton, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral Targeting and the
Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 564 (2012); Online Tracking, supra note 4.
Likened to “a normal browser cookie on steroids,” Flash cookies have greater capacity
and more features than first and third-party cookies. See An Introduction to Flash
Cookies; How to Manage Them, PRACT. ECOMMERCE (Mar. 16, 2011),
https://www.practicalecommerce.com/An-Introduction-to-Flash-Cookies-How-to-ManageThem [https://perma.cc/P39M-93VE]. For example, Flash cookies generally store
twenty-five times more data than first- and third-party cookies. ALEECIA M. MCDONALD
& LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, A SURVEY OF ADOBE FLASH LOCAL SHARED OBJECTS TO
RESPAWN HTTP COOKIES 3 (2011).
Additionally, unlike first- and third-party cookies that may eventually expire, Flash
cookies do not expire or delete unless an internet user finds and deletes the cookies.
Id.
48. Flash cookies are stored offline in Adobe Flash Player. Online Tracking, supra
note 4. One of the only ways to manage and delete Flash cookie is to visit Adobe’s
website.
Flash Player Help, ADOBE, http://www.macromedia.com/support/
documentation/en/flashplayer/help/settings_manager07.html [https://perma.cc
/YG5R-U8U9].
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cookies from most users’ attempts to delete their cookies and
ensuring the Flash cookies can regenerate deleted tracking cookies in
all internet browsers on a computer. 49
B. Practical Concerns Raised by Tracking Cookies
Tracking cookies have fundamentally diverged from the original
purpose of cookies and now raise significant privacy concerns as
Americans increasingly use the internet. 50 First, tracking cookies have
enabled websites and advertisers to track internet users and to create
concentrated databases of profiles of billions of people. 51 While some
databases may be obvious, such as Facebook’s collection of profiles of
1.65 billion individuals, other databases, like AddThis’s profiles of 1.9
billion people, are less apparent. 52 Similarly, tracking cookies are
rampant across the internet, thus ensuring that internet users’
browsing history will be tracked. 53
49. ASHKAN SOLTANI ET AL., FLASH COOKIES AND PRIVACY 158 (2009) (advising that
erasing a browser’s cookies, cache, search history, and private data will not delete
Flash cookies); see MCDONALD & CRANOR, supra note 47.
50. See Monica Anderson et al., 10% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are
They?, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 22, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/05/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they
[https://perma.cc/9QMQ-35G3] (documenting that 90% of Americans now use the
internet compared to only 52% in 2000); see also Andrew Perrin & Jingjing Jiang, About a
Quarter of U.S. Adults Say They Are “Almost Constantly” Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 14, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/14/about-a-quarter-of-americansreport-going-online-almost-constantly [https://perma.cc/DWB7-2B5S] (reporting that
77% of Americans use the internet daily, 43% use the internet several times a day, and
26% use the internet “almost constantly”). Compare, e.g., Shayndi Raice & Julia Angwin,
Facebook ‘Unfair’ on Privacy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2011), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052970203441704577068400622644374 (“The very fundamental
business model of Facebook is to collect information about you and use it to sell ads.”),
with supra note 33 (explaining how cookies initially only brought personalization to a
business model).
51. See Ibrahim Altaweel et al., Web Privacy Census, J. TECH. SCI. (Dec. 15, 2015),
https://techscience.org/a/2015121502 [https://perma.cc/SYK6-NZ75] (finding
Google tracking technology on “92 of the top 100 most popular websites and on 923
of the top 1,000 websites”).
52. Boerman et al., supra note 7, at 364; see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1412
(2001) (recalling that, in 1999, Google DoubleClick had profiles for eighty million
customers). See generally Nurie Mohamed, You Deleted Your Cookies? Think Again,
WIRED (Aug. 10, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/08/you-deleted-your-cookiesthink-again [https://perma.cc/BS9V-E29J] (noting that 300,000 companies use
AddThis for ad placement).
53. See Altaweel et al., supra note 51 (finding that the top 100 internet sites
contained 6280 cookies—83% of which were third-party cookies); MCDONALD &
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Similarly, the inability to opt out of tracking cookie data collection
exacerbates privacy concerns raised by these databases. If internet users
read a website’s privacy policy and wish to remove the tracking and Flash
cookies lodged in their computers, most website privacy policies do not
identify or disclose discreet third-party data collectors, thus rendering
most internet users’ choices about their data sharing “[i]nvisible and
[i]ncomplete.”54 Moreover, most attempts to remove or inhibit the
collection of tracking cookies are futile. This futility is due, in part, to
Flash cookies that regenerate deleted cookies, unbeknownst to users.55
Similarly, “Do Not Track” settings56 in internet browsers have failed
because companies are not legally required to honor “Do Not Track”
requests.57 Accordingly, many companies explicitly state in their privacy
policies that they do not honor “Do Not Track” requests. 58
CRANOR, supra note 2, at 2 (highlighting that Google tracks about 90% of internet
users).
54. TIMOTHY LIBERT, AN AUTOMATED APPROACH TO AUDITING DISCLOSURE OF
THIRD-PARTY DATA COLLECTION IN WEBSITE PRIVACY POLICIES 211 (2018) (reporting
that, while an average of 22% of website privacy policies disclosed that user
information would be conveyed to Google, Facebook, or Twitter, only 0.3% of privacy
policies disclosed that user information would be conveyed to Acxiom); see FTC, supra
note 43, at 49.
55. See supra notes 47–49 (detailing the discreet and strategic use of Flash
cookies); see also Brotherton, supra note 47, at 563 (noting that ad networks have
implemented mechanisms to prevent users from removing tracking cookies).
Furthermore, even if astute internet users visit third-parties’ websites to opt out of
their cookie practices, their efforts may be stymied by unclear and confusing opt-out
choices. See FTC, supra note 43, at 49 (noting that data brokers’ websites are not
“consumer-facing,” obfuscating internet users’ ability to control whether or how their
information is collected).
56. When activated, the “Do Not Track” setting prompts an internet user’s
browser to request that each website that an internet user visits does not track the
user. See Brotherton, supra note 47, at 569 (comparing the “Do Not Track” setting to
the Do Not Call list for telemarketing).
57. See Online Tracking, supra note 4 (noting that a company is only legally
obligated to fulfill “Do Not Track” requests if the company commits to honoring
them). Although there have been coordinated efforts to standardize and regulate
“Do Not Track” requests, these too have proven unsuccessful. See Do Not Track, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/do-not-track [https://perma.cc
/2M7V-SWBA] (noting that negotiations to standardize “Do Not Track” practices
collapsed when the Digital Advertising Alliance—to which companies, such as
Google, Facebook, and Microsoft belong—withdrew from the negotiations); see also
Consumer Watchdog Petition for Rulemaking to Require Edge Providers to Honor ‘Do Not
Track’ Requests, 30 FCC Rcd. 12424 (2015) (dismissing a petition to regulate edge
providers [suppliers of content], reaffirming that “[t]he [FCC] has been unequivocal
in declaring that it has no intent to regulate edge providers”).
58. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/privacy [https://
perma.cc/8HUT-C3TZ] (“We do not support the Do Not Track browser option.”);
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS APPLICABLE TO BROWSING HISTORY AND
COOKIES
To understand the privacy interests in browsing history, Part II.A briefly
surveys evolving conceptions of privacy before charting the sea changes in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence between privacy grounded in property
rights versus “expectations of privacy.” Part II.B identifies the limitations
on privacy rights under modern interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment and the third-party doctrine, and Part II.C.1–2 explores the
privacy interests recognized within the doctrine’s confines. Part II.D–E
unpacks the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States,
explaining the Court’s curtailment of the third-party doctrine as applied
to historical CSLI and stoking the debate that Carpenter’s holding applies
to additional types of information.
A. Privacy and the Fourth Amendment
Defining “privacy” has long eluded precise resolve. Despite its perennial
value that predates the United States’ founding, “[f]ew values so
fundamental to society as privacy have been left so undefined.”59 Although
privacy remains undefined today, surveying various conceptualizations of
privacy in American history may elucidate its core tenets.
1.

Evolving conceptions of privacy
In the colonial era, privacy safeguarded four aspects of individualism:
“personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and
protected communication.”60 In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis

Privacy Statement, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/legal/privacy [https://perma.
cc/YXY8-KP2K] (“At this time, we do not respond to Web browser ‘do not track’
signals”); Target Privacy Policy, TARGET, https://www.target.com/c/target-privacypolicy/-/N-4sr7p [https://perma.cc/T98X-YGCC] (disclosing that “we do not
respond to browser ‘do not track’ signals,” but users may “opt out of interest-based
advertising”). Additionally, Google and Facebook have both announced that they do
not honor “Do Not Track Requests” because internet users do not understand what
“do not track” actually means. Elise Ackerman, Google and Facebook Ignore “Do Not
Track Requests, Claim They Confuse Consumers, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/02/27/big-internet-companies-struggleover-proper-response-to-consumers-do-not-track-requests [https://perma.cc/SC3C-JE4P]
(identifying concerns that honoring “Do Not Track” requests may impede features that
consumers did not intend to change and, consequently, not meet users’ expectations).
59. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). While no definitive answer
explains why privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution, “[t]o define is to limit”
and perhaps its absence is an intentional safeguard for the right to privacy. See OSCAR
WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 148 (1890).
60. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 3 (1972). More
specifically, privacy protected colonists from having to disclose their personalities,
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(later Justice Brandeis) defined the right to privacy as the “right of the
individual to be let alone.”61 Seventy years later, William Prosser categorized
privacy cases into four distinct torts: intruding into another’s solitude,
publicly disclosing another’s embarrassing private details, misrepresenting
another’s public image, and advantageously appropriating another’s
likeness.62 In 1967, Professor Alan Westin denoted privacy as “the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”63
Recently, Daniel Solove has posited that privacy touches many facets of
life as pluralistic protections against a set of problems that “do not share one
element in common but that nevertheless bear a resemblance to each
other.”64 While privacy persists as a “Cheshire cat of values,” it continues to
indelibly influence American jurisprudence and society.65

thus “expos[ing themselves] to the shame of total understanding.” Id. at 4. Privacy
also championed the sanctity of emotional release, providing a colonist refuge from
the stresses of daily life and social norms. See id. at 4 (quoting DIARY AND
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, I, 96 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 1961)).
I must converse and deal with Mankind, and move and stir from one scene
of Action and Debate and Business, and Pleasure, and Conversation, to
another and grow weary all before I shall feel the strong Desire of retiring to
contemplation on Men and Business and Pleasure and Books. After hard
Labour at Husbandry, Reading and Reflection in Retirement will be a Relief
and a high refined Pleasure.
Id. (quoting John Adams). In addition, privacy safeguarded an individual’s ability to
reflect upon experiences, events, and religious engagements. Id. Finally, privacy
fostered open and safe communication with others without fear that the
communications would be leaked to the public, thus allowing an individual to
maintain distinct interpersonal relationships. Id. at 4–5.
61. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
200, 211 (1890) (identifying the inadequacies of the existing privacy protections
afforded by contract law and property law).
62. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
63. WESTIN, supra note 59.
64. See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 756, 763 (2007) (reconciling conceptualizations of
privacy that disregard that “not all privacy problems are equal” and that privacy’s
values depend on the problem or harm at issue).
65. But see JONATHAN FRANZEN, Imperial Bedroom, in HOW TO BE ALONE: ESSAYS 42
(2002) (describing privacy as “the rallying cry of activists fighting for reproductive
rights, against stalkers, for the right to die, against a national health-care database,
for stronger data-encryption standards, against paparazzi, for the sanctity of employer email, and against employee drug testing,” but “[o]n closer examination, though, privacy
proves to be the Cheshire cat of values: not much substance, but a very winning smile”).
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2.

Evolution of the Fourth Amendment
Although neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights mention
the word “privacy,” the Fourth Amendment is one implicit
manifestation of the amorphous notion of privacy.66 The Fourth
Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures” absent a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause.67
The Court’s early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence interpreted
the Fourth Amendment through a property-rights framework. 68
However, in 1967, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolved when the
Court decided Katz v. United States,69 introducing the reasonable
expectation of privacy test in holding that the government conducted an
unreasonable search when it recorded the contents of the defendant’s
phone conversation in a public telephone booth.70 In rejecting the
defendant’s property-based privacy arguments,71 the Court clarified that
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”72
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan introduced the two-pronged
“reasonable expectation of privacy” Katz test that has become the

66. See id. (recognizing that the Third and Fifth Amendments also implicitly
address privacy).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57, 465–66 (1928)
(declining to extend the Fourth Amendment to wiretapped telephone lines located
outside the defendants’ properties, holding that the government did not conduct a
search or seizure because the government did not search or seize any person, papers,
or “tangible material effects”), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634–35, 638 (1886) (invoking both the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to hold that the compulsory production of a person’s papers
to substantiate a criminal charge against that person constitutes an unreasonable
search and seizure).
69. 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967), superseded by statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
70. See id. at 348, 351–53 (finding that the recording of the contents of Katz’s
conversation “violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth”); id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (introducing the
reasonable expectation of privacy test to clarify the majority’s holding); see also Peter
C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of the Fourth Amendment
and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73, 116 (2018)
(denoting Katz as the source of the “content and non-content” distinction in thirdparty doctrine precedent).
71. On appeal, the defendant argued that a public telephone booth constitutes
a constitutionally protected area and that physical trespass is not necessary to conduct an
unconstitutional search and seizure. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, 349–51 (majority opinion).
72. Id. at 351.
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touchstone of Fourth Amendment privacy rights. 73 Under the Katz
test, the Fourth Amendment recognizes and protects an expectation
of privacy when an individual has “exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy” and that “expectation [is] one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 74
Although some have lauded the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test,75 others have severely criticized it.76 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has generally applied the Katz test using a normative
framework,77 balancing several factors; including, inter alia, assumption
of risk, property interests, location, and expectations of privacy; to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment protects a specific privacy
interest.78 Therefore, understanding these limitations and normative
factors may clarify the current scope of the Fourth Amendment.
73. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring); see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
211 (1986) (identifying Justice Harlan’s two-pronged test in Katz as the touchstone
of Fourth Amendment privacy rights).
74. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
75. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 382 (1974) (championing Katz as the “watershed in fourth amendment
jurisprudence”); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 649
(1985) (recognizing the decision as “[t]he Katz Revolution”).
76. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (“[W]e still don’t even know what [Katz’s] ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ test is. Is it supposed to pose an empirical question . . . or a normative
one . . . ? Either way brings problems.”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[The Katz test] involves a degree of circularity, and
judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the
hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. In addition, the Katz test
rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed
and stable set of privacy expectations.”); ANDREW E. TASLITZ ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has never
defined “reasonableness” pertaining to expectations of privacy nor stated whether
the Court evaluates reasonableness through a majoritarian or normative framework);
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2015) (arguing that subjective expectations of privacy are
irrelevant under Katz); Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839, 846 (2008)
(scrutinizing the Court’s post-Katz decisions as “outcome-based jurisprudence” that
use “haphazard” and inconsistent analyses).
77. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that, despite
Katz’s majoritarian framing, the Court’s jurisprudence can only be understood
through a normative framework that asks “whether a particular practice should be
considered a search under the Fourth Amendment”).
78. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 76, at 107–09, 135–45 (noting that the Court
becomes “society’s representative” when determining whether an expectation of
privacy is objectively reasonable and identifying additional factors, such as social
custom and legality or intimacy of activities involved).
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B. Limitations on Expectations of Privacy: The Third-Party Doctrine
Amongst one of the most controversial aspects of the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test is the third-party doctrine. Principled upon
an assumption of the risk theory, the third-party doctrine mandates that
“a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.” 79 The third-party doctrine has
evolved from its misplaced trust doctrinal roots and now serves as an
invaluable tool for the government to obtain records from third
parties.80 This section briefly explains misplaced trust doctrine
jurisprudence before exploring the third-party doctrine’s evolution and
rationale.
1.

Misplaced trust doctrine
The misplaced trust doctrine states that an individual waives his
Fourth Amendment protections when he confides his wrongdoing to
another person whom he mistakenly believes will not reveal it. 81 The
misplaced trust doctrine arose from cases, many decided before Katz,
involving assertions of privacy interests in information confided to
informants and undercover government agents. For example, in On Lee
v. United States,82 the Court held that the government did not violate the
Fourth Amendment by equipping the defendant’s friend with a recording
device, finding the recording device indistinguishable from an agent
“eavesdropping outside an open window.”83 A decade later, in Lopez v.
United States,84 the Court upheld an IRS agent covertly recording the
defendant’s attempts to bribe the agent, concluding that the defendant
risked that the bribe would be “accurately reproduced in court, whether
by faultless memory or mechanical recording.”85 Similarly, in Hoffa v.
79. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that even if one
exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a
third party, such an expectation “is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
80. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1083, 1084–86 (2002) (arguing that, inter alia, the government
should regulate the transfer of personal information from the private sector to the
government in a way that balances privacy and effective law enforcement).
81. Chris J. Chasin, The Revolution Will Be Tweeted, but the Tweets Will Be Subpoenaed:
Reimagining Fourth Amendment Privacy to Protect Associational Anonymity, 2014 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y, 1, 18–19.
82. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
83. Id. at 753–54.
84. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
85. See id. at 439 (rejecting that the defendant had a right to rely on the IRS
agent’s fallible memory).
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United States,86 the Court held that the government did not violate the
Fourth Amendment when the defendant confided in a colleague who,
unbeknownst to the defendant, worked for police, and the colleague
subsequently testified about the defendant’s statements.87 The Court noted
that, as is “inherent in the condition[] of human society,” whenever an
individual speaks he risks that he may be “eavesdropp[ed] or betrayed by an
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals.”88
Post-Katz, the Court again upheld the misplaced trust doctrine in United
States v. White,89 warning that an individual committing crimes assumes the
risk that his companions may be reporting to the government.90 The
following section explores how the misplaced trust doctrine served as a
foundation for the third-party doctrine and delineates the rationales
contouring this distinct doctrine.
2.

Third-party doctrine
The modern third-party doctrine emerged from the misplaced trust
doctrine. In United States v. Miller,91 government agents subpoenaed the
defendant’s bank records to investigate tax crimes.92 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit suppressed the bank records on the
grounds that the government circumvented the defendant’s constitutional
rights by obtaining the records from a third party,93 but the Supreme Court
reversed in favor of the government.94 First, the Court examined the nature
of the records and concluded that the bank records were not “private
papers” but rather negotiable instruments exposed to bank employees
during the ordinary course of business.95 Second, the Court cited the entire
line of misplaced trust jurisprudence and held that the defendant could not
reasonably expect privacy in records voluntarily conveyed to a third party,
even if they conveyed the records only for a limited purpose. 96

86. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
87. Id. at 303.
88. Id. (quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
89. 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 751–52.
91. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
92. Id. at 437.
93. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)), rev’d, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
94. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
95. See id. at 440–42 (noting that the defendant did not possess or own the bank
records).
96. See id. at 443 (first citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)
(plurality opinion); then citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); and
then citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963)).
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Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland,97 the Court held that the
defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone
numbers dialed and subsequently intercepted by a pen register. 98
Applying the third-party doctrine refined by Miller, the Court held
that the defendant voluntarily conveyed and exposed the dialed
numbers to the telephone company and its operating equipment and,
therefore, assumed the risk that the telephone company would disclose
the dialed numbers to the police.99 Addressing the technological
innovation of automatic call routing and billing, the Court refused to
“make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment” by grounding the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in a company’s decision to use
a human or automated operator.100
In his dissent, Justice Marshall rebuked the majority’s holding, submitting
that “[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at
all.”101 Moreover, he doubted whether a person who knows that a
telephone company records calls for billing purposes assumes that the
company will convey his call information to the government.102 Justice
Marshall asserted that “[i]mplicit in the concept of assumption of risk is
some notion of choice” and noted that an individual lacks such choice
where the individual must accept surveillance or forgo technology
essential to modern life.103 Justice Marshall warned that making
assumption of risk dispositive in determining reasonable expectations of
privacy empowers the government to dictate the Fourth Amendment’s
scope merely by providing prior notice of surveillance.104
Third-party doctrine jurisprudence rests upon two underlying
rationales: voluntary conveyance and reduced expectations of privacy in

97. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
98. Id. at 745–46 (rejecting that the pen register constituted a Fourth
Amendment search). A pen register is “a device that records numbers dialed from a
phone line.” United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th Cir. 2008).
99. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
100. See id. at 745 (rejecting the defendant’s assertion that he possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy because a machine, rather than a human,
ordinarily transferred his phone calls, and the machine did not record the
defendant’s local calls).
101. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 749–50 (arguing that the concept of “assumption of risk” is diluted
where “individuals have no realistic alternative”).
104. See id. (illustrating that the government could foreclose reasonable
expectations of privacy in the contents of mail or phone calls merely by announcing
its intent to monitor).
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information knowingly shared with another.105 Derived from Smith and
Miller,106 voluntary conveyance requires that a conveyance be intentional
and presumably with the conveyor’s knowledge. 107 However, consent
does not subsume voluntariness, 108 thus leading several scholars to
advocate that the vulnerabilities of consent in online contracting, such
as agreeing to the terms of a privacy policy, militate using consent as the
dispositive touchstone of fair information practices.109 Some assert that a
105. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018) (identifying
the reduced expectations of privacy and “voluntary exposure” justifications as
integral to the third-party doctrine analysis).
106. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 745 (rejecting the defendant’s expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers on the grounds that they were voluntarily conveyed to
the phone company, which had the equipment and right to record the numbers);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (observing that the defendant’s bank
records “contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to
their employees in the ordinary course of business”).
107. Compare United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 266 n.40 (3d Cir. 2017)
(reaffirming In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010),
which held that CSLI is involuntarily conveyed to wireless service providers because
consumers are unlikely to know that their wireless providers collect and store
historical CSLI), reh’g granted, vacated in part, No. 15-4094, 2018 WL 4139784 (3d Cir.
Aug. 30, 2018), with United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 430 n.12 (4th Cir. 2016)
(concluding that an individual voluntarily conveys historical CSLI to wireless
providers as an inherent consequence of agreeing to use and using a cell phone and
noting that voluntariness, as posited by Smith and Miller, “does not require
contemporaneous recognition of every detail an individual conveys to a third party”),
and United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that CSLI is
voluntarily conveyed because users must convey CSLI, like the phone numbers in
Smith, to complete phone calls). But see Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How
the Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 1, 30
(2016) (scrutinizing the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Smith as conflating
“information that is ‘necessarily’ conveyed” with “knowing, voluntary conveyance”).
108. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 248–49 (1973) (rejecting
that consent alone authorizes a search of an individual not in custody and holding
that the consent must be voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement).
109. See Lisa M. Austin, Enough About Me: Why Privacy Is About Power, Not Consent
(or Harm), in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW CAN AND SHOULD DO? 189
(Austin Sarat ed., 2015) (concluding that consent-based privacy models inadequately
protect consumers considering “the emerging corporate-state nexus that has created
such a striking surveillance infrastructure on the internet”); Woodrow Hartzog, The
Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 956, 965–66 (2017)
(arguing that fair information practices relying upon consent have ossified and must
be revised). Some scholars have described consenting online as “qualitatively
different” than in the real world because of the greater disparity in bargaining power
between internet users and online businesses. See Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and
the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 661, 661–62 (2012)
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consent-based framework turns privacy rules into “formalistic exercises
designed to extract consent and use the gift of control” to shift risks to
consumers.110 Others have noted that, although internet users are
empowered to consent as they wish, this control may be “too much of a good
thing” if users fatigue from consent requests.111 Moreover, the consentbased framework may not adequately apply to modern information sharing
practices in which the first parties with whom users interact are merely
intermediaries for third parties.112
The second rationale—a reduced expectation of privacy in
information knowingly shared—analyzes the nature of the information
sought to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists
in the content.113 For example, in Miller, the Court held that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of his bank records because they were negotiable commercial instruments
exposed to employees during the ordinary course of business.114 Similarly,
the Court has recognized a reduced expectation of privacy in telephone
numbers dialed because the numbers alone reveal limited quantities of
information voluntarily conveyed to telephone companies to use a

(explaining how social media bulletins have helped bridge the “complete and
absolute” online bargaining disparity); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 529, 549–50, 556 (2007) (advocating for a “medium-specific contract
doctrine of consent” guided by a “reasonable digital consumer standard” to reconcile
contracting online and in the real world). Scholars attribute this disparity to several
factors. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting
in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 480 (2002) (inability to ask an agent about
terms); Matwyshyn, supra (easily manipulatable consent factors); Natasha Lomas &
Romain Dillet, Terms and Conditions Are the Biggest Lie of Our Industry, TECHCRUNCH,
https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/21/agree-to-disagree [https://perma.cc/4CF42T94] (difficulty of reading policies).
110. Hartzog, supra note 109, at 964.
111. See id. at 975 (noting that, without any alternative, consent fatigue causes
internet users to consent away their privacy); see also Roger Brownsword, Consent in
Data Protection Law: Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality, in REINVENTING DATA
PROTECTION? 83, 90 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009) (warning about the dangers of the
“routinisation” of consent in which internet users merely “tick the box” due to consent fatigue).
112. Hartzog, supra note 109, at 967–68 (noting that modern information sharing practices
are predicated upon “individual-organization relationship[s]” between only two parties).
113. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
114. Id.
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phone.115 However, an individual may still have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in information subject to a reduced expectation of privacy.116
C.

Piecing Together the Privacy that Remains

The third-party doctrine has set bright-line boundaries constraining
expectations of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to others.
However, after piecing together the privacy that remains, a disparity
between the physical and virtual worlds becomes apparent. While the
Supreme Court has become increasingly reluctant to extend the thirdparty doctrine to foreclose an expectation of privacy in one’s movement
and location in the physical world, other courts have not hesitated to
abridge expectations of privacy in an internet user’s movement from one
website to another. The following sections explore this divide, setting
the stage for its reconciliation.
1.

Privacy interests in movements and location
The Supreme Court has recognized a limited expectation of privacy in
one’s location.117 However, the Court did not originally recognize such a
right. In United States v. Knotts,118 the government obtained consent from a
chemical seller to place a beeper inside a chemical container that the
defendants, suspected of manufacturing drugs, would later purchase.119
The government used the beeper and visual surveillance to trace the
chemicals to Knotts’s cabin and to obtain a search warrant.120 The Court
rejected that the warrantless monitoring violated Knotts’s expectation of
privacy in his movements and declined to find a reasonable expectation
of privacy in one’s movement where a person travels on public
thoroughfares, thus voluntarily conveying his movements to anyone in

115. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (noting that a pen register
only collects the numbers dialed and that the defendant voluntarily exposed the
numbers to the telephone company’s equipment during the ordinary course of
business). But see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–93 (2014) (rejecting that
phone numbers accompanied by “identifying information that an individual might
add” in a phone’s call log are subject to a reduced expectation of privacy).
116. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (quoting Riley,
134 S. Ct. at 2488) (“[T]he fact of ‘diminished privacy interests does not mean that
the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.’”).
117. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that the
government conducts a search when it installs a tracking device on a vehicle to
monitor the vehicle’s movements).
118. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
119. Id. at 278.
120. Id. at 278–79 (noting that the government did not use the beeper after
locating the cabin).
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sight.121 The Court dismissed the argument that the government’s use of
technology could lead to pervasive surveillance of citizens, but it reserved
that “different constitutional principles may be applicable” if technology
eventually enables the government to conduct “dragnet-type law
enforcement practices.”122
The Court circumscribed Knotts in United States v. Karo, 123 in which
a government informant notified the government that the defendants
had ordered from the informant cans of chemicals for illicit drug activity.124
Pursuant to a court order and the informant’s consent, the government
placed a tracking beeper in one of the cans and used the beeper and visual
surveillance to follow Karo to his house and to track the can within his
house.125 Limiting Knotts, the Court held that monitoring a beeper in a
private residence that is not open to visual surveillance constitutes an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.126
Almost thirty years after Karo, the Court revisited privacy interests
in an individual’s movements in United States v. Jones, 127 in which the
government installed a GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle and
tracked its movements for twenty-eight days. 128 Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia sidestepped the Katz test and applied the trespass
doctrine, holding that the installation of the GPS device on the
defendant’s vehicle and the monitoring of his movements constituted
a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 129 Justice Scalia
121. See id. at 279, 281–82, 285 (equating the warrantless beeper monitoring to a
government agent physically following an automobile and positing that visual
surveillance would have revealed the same information conveyed by the beeper).
122. See id. at 283–84 (explaining that, until the government conducts such
pervasive and intrusive practices, “police efficiency” does not warrant
unconstitutionality).
123. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
124. Id. at 708.
125. Id. at 708–10.
126. See id. at 715–17 (emphasizing that, although beepers are less intrusive than
physical searches, beepers reveal important details about the “the interior of the
premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant”).
127. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
128. Id. at 402–03. The government actually obtained a warrant to install the GPS
device; however, the government failed to install the device within the authorized
ten-day period. Id. Conceding that it contravened the warrant, the government
argued that it did not need a warrant to install and use the GPS tracker. See id. at 402,
403 n.1.
129. See id. at 404–05, 409 (clarifying that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”).
The Court did not answer whether the search was unreasonable because the
argument was not raised below. Id. at 413.
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distinguished Jones from Knotts and Karo on the grounds that, unlike
in Knotts and Karo where the government hid the beepers with the
consent of third parties before the defendants obtained the bugged
goods, Jones possessed the vehicle when the government installed
and used the GPS device and, therefore, constituted a trespass. 130
Although Justice Scalia notably resurrected property-based privacy rights,
the potency of Jones emanates from its two concurring opinions by Justice
Alito and Justice Sotomayor.131 Justice Alito viewed Jones through Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test and recognized that technology can
change expectations of privacy.132 Although he acknowledged the
reasonableness of the short-term monitoring of a person’s public
movements, Justice Alito cautioned that longer-term monitoring would
violate most expectations of privacy, citing that society’s expectations
espouse that “law enforcement agents and others would not—and . . . could
not—secretly monitor and catalogue” a person’s every movement.133
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence doubted the utility of the majority’s
trespass-based holding and reliance on the third-party doctrine. Justice
Sotomayor condemned the majority’s reliance on the trespass-doctrine,
acknowledging that modern surveillance does not require physical
trespass.134 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor expounded upon Justice
Alito’s concerns about expectations of privacy against comprehensive
tracking of movements, highlighting that GPS tracking produces detailed
records of movements that reveal “a wealth of detail” about “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”135 Justice
Sotomayor noted that these records can be stored and mined for years,
130. See id. at 404, 409–10 (stating that the government physically occupied private
property to obtain the information).
131. See Margot Kaminski, Three Thoughts on U.S. v. Jones, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 24,
2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20190219125855/https://concurringopinions
.com/archives/2012/01/three-thoughts-on-u-s-v-jones.html [https://perma.cc/BR9HYEQB] (lauding Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence as having “the greatest practical impact” and
denouncing Justice Alito’s concurrence as “the most dangerous part of these opinions”).
132. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 419, 427, 429 (Alito, J., concurring) (forecasting that
people may eventually accept the tradeoff of increased convenience for decreased
privacy).
133. See id. at 419, 430 (concluding that four weeks of tracking constituted “longterm monitoring” that violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy);
see also United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones, 565
U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring)) (adding that technology has enabled the
government to comprehensively track individuals in ways previously impossible).
134. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (forecasting that the
government may eventually exploit tracking devices incorporated in vehicles and
smart phones).
135. Id. at 415 (citing New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
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allowing the government to evade practical limitations that protect privacy
rights.136 Most notably, Justice Sotomayor doubted the viability of the thirdparty doctrine, labeling the doctrine as “ill suited to the digital age.”137
2.

Internet users’ expectations of privacy
Courts and scholars have not uniformly recognized an expectation
of privacy against tracking cookies or in browsing history.138 Generally,
parties who have challenged tracking cookies as a violation of a person’s
expectation of privacy in browsing history have relied upon the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”).139 Enacted as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 140 legislators
implemented the SCA to extend Fourth Amendment privacy rights
into the digital realm to protect service providers’ customers and

136. See id. at 415–16 (advancing that unchecked surveillance could “chill[]
associational and expressive freedoms” and “alter the relationship between citizen
and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society” (quoting United
States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring),
vacated by Cuevas-Perez, 565 U.S. 1189 (2012))).
137. See id. at 417 (suggesting reconsideration of the third-party doctrine in the
digital age “in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties” while “carrying out mundane tasks”).
138. Compare, e.g., In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274–77, 1282
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently claimed that
placement of cookies on personal computers violated the SCA), and In re DoubleClick
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 508, 511, 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(concluding that internet access constitutes an electronic communications service
but dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims that DoubleClick violated, inter alia, the SCA and
the Wiretap Act by placing cookies on the plaintiffs’ computers to track users across
its network websites and holding that DoubleClick’s clients consented to DoubleClick
intercepting the plaintiffs’ communications), with In re Facebook Internet Tracking
Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims that
Facebook violated the SCA by tracking users’ browsing history using tracking
technology on the grounds that the SCA does not apply to information locally stored
on a computer and that personal computers do not constitute “facilities” or
“electronic communication providers” under the SCA), and Orin S. Kerr, A User’s
Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214–15 (2004) (arguing that the SCA does not apply to tracking
cookies on personal computers because personal computers are not a provider of
electronic communication service (“ECS”)). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012)
(defining an ECS as any service that allows a user “to send or receive wire or electronic
communications”).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2701–2712 (2012).
140. Id. § 2510.
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subscribers against “unauthorized access to, and disclosure of,” their
stored electronic communications held by network service providers.141
The SCA provides hierarchical protections depending on whether
the information sought constitutes “content” or “non-content” of
electronic communications.142 “Content” includes “any information
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication.”143 The government must obtain a search warrant to
acquire communications content.144
Conversely, the SCA provides less protection for non-content
information, such as “dialing, routing, addressing [or] signaling”
information (“DRAS information”). 145 The government may obtain
non-content information; such as a subscriber’s name, address,
communication connection records, and payment methods; pursuant
to a warrant or less demanding forms of process, such as a § 2703(d)

141. See id. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communications” as “any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, . . . or intelligence of any nature); S. REP. NO. 99-541,
at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559 (noting the disparate
protections afforded to electronic communications compared to traditional mail and
stating that “the law must advance with the technology to ensure the continued
vitality of the fourth amendment”); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125
YALE L.J. 326, 361 (2015) (delineating the various levels of SCA protections); Kerr,
supra note 138, at 1209–10, 1212 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s strong
privacy protections in the physical world do not necessarily transfer into the digital
realm of “ones and zeroes stored somewhere on somebody else’s computer”); see also
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1265, 1266 (1999) (“Privacy, in Fourth Amendment terms, is something that exists only
in certain types of spaces; not surprisingly, the law protects it only where it exists.”).
142. See Eric R. Hinz, Note, A Distinctionless Distinction: Why the RCS/ECS Distinction in
the Stored Communications Act Does Not Work, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 499 (2012)
(delineating the various levels of protections afforded to the content of communications);
see also Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 70, at 116 (denoting Katz as the source of the
“content and non-content” distinction in third-party doctrine precedent).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012); see also In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098,
1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (defining “contents” under the ECPA as “the intended message
conveyed by the communication,” excluding message characteristics generated
during the communication).
144. § 2703(a).
145. See id. § 3121(c) (authorizing the government to install and use pen registers
or trap and trace devices to capture non-content information); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743, 745–46 (1979) (holding that the government’s use of a pen register
to record telephone numbers dialed, but not the content of the communications, did
not constitute an unreasonable search); H.R. REP. NO. 107-236(I), at 53 (2001)
(affirming Smith v. Maryland’s distinction between content and non-content
information).
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order or a subpoena. 146 Thus, under the current legal framework,
statutory privacy protections primarily turn on whether browsing
history or individual Universal Resource Locators (“URLs”) constitute
content or non-content.
Several courts have recognized that a URL may include search terms
that constitute content. 147 In United States v. Forrester, 148 the Ninth
Circuit held that the government’s collection of IP addresses of visited
websites using a mirroring device was indistinguishable from the pen
register surveillance upheld in Smith. 149 The court explained that IP
addresses, like the telephone numbers in Smith, are affirmatively and
voluntarily conveyed to third parties when a user navigates the
internet, and that an IP address does not reveal the contents of the
websites viewed. 150 However, the court excluded from its holding
techniques that allow the government to collect both the IP address
and the URL of webpages visited because, unlike an IP address, a URL
identifies specific webpages that a user visited, thus providing a more
precise and revealing picture of the user’s internet activity. 151
Similarly, in In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, 152 the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed that a URL may include content if search terms are

146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(A)–(B), 2703(c)(2)(A)–(F) (2012); see, e.g., id.
§ 2703(d) (delineating that the government may obtain a § 2703(d) order from a
magistrate judge upon a mere showing of “specific and articulable facts” that the
subscriber information sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation”).
147. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d
125, 137–38 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 32 (FISA
Ct. 2010), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NVK-CWDQ]) (surveying the sea changes in the classification
of location identifiers as content or non-contents and acknowledging the “growing
chorus” of judicial recognition that “some, if not most, queried URLs do contain
content”); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d at 1108–09 (acknowledging, in dicta,
that “[u]nder some circumstances, a user’s request to a search engine for specific
information could constitute a communication such that divulging a URL containing
that search term to a third party could amount to disclosure of the contents of a
communication”); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 n.6 (9th Cir.
2008) (stating, in dicta, that surveillance techniques that collect both the IP addresses
and URLs of webpages visited “might be more constitutionally problematic”).
148. 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
149. Id. at 505, 511.
150. Id. at 510.
151. See id. at 510–11 n.6 (illustrating that IP addresses reveal “only that a person
visited the New York Times’ website at http://www.nytimes.com,” whereas URLs
“divulge the particular articles the person viewed”).
152. 750 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014).
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contained within the URL. 153 The plaintiffs alleged that defendants
Facebook and Zynga disclosed the contents of their electronic
communications when they shared with third parties the internet users’
unique Facebook identifiers and the webpage from which the users
clicked to play a Zynga social media game. 154 Relying on the court’s
holding in Forrester, the plaintiffs argued that the webpage addresses
revealed contents because they disclosed what webpage the user
previously viewed, proffering that “if a Facebook user who was gay and
struggling to come out of the closet was viewing the Facebook page of
a gay support group, and then clicked on an ad, the advertiser would
know . . . that s/he was viewing the Facebook page of a gay support
group just before navigating to their site.” 155 However, the court
rejected this argument on the grounds that webpage addresses alone
“constitute addressing information” that does not reveal the contents
of the communications. 156 Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
its dicta in Forrester, recognizing that a URL may contain search terms
that constitute content, it rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
Facebook identifier and addressing information in Zynga resembled
the search terms contemplated in Forrester. 157
Additionally, a recently declassified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) opinion explicitly rejected that “DRAS information and
contents are ‘mutually exclusive.’”158 The FISC recognized that a URL
may include search terms that constitute contents.159 Moreover, the
Second Circuit recently held that plaintiffs may sue companies that use
cookies to profile and sell anonymized browsing history—even if it
does not contain personally identifiable information. 160 Despite the
153. See id. at 1108–09 (citing Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–11) (affirming the district
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim for failing to allege that contents of electronic
communications were divulged).
154. Id. at 1100, 1102–03.
155. Id. at 1108.
156. See id. (restating that, unlike the “contents of a communication,” the Fourth
Amendment does not protect “record information about those communications”).
157. Id. at 1108–09.
158. [Redacted],
No.
PR/TT
[Redacted],
at
31
(FISA
Ct.
2010), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%202.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NVK-CWDQ].
159. See id. at 32 (quoting In re Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D. Mass.
2005)) (noting that the search terms embedded in the URL reveal “‘the substance’
and ‘meaning’ of the communication . . . that the user is conducting a search for
information on a particular topic”).
160. See Mount v. PulsePoint, Inc., 684 F. App’x 32, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2017)
(concluding that neither case law nor the “common law tort of intrusion upon
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United States’ small strides toward strengthening online privacy
rights, 161 U.S. courts have enhanced Fourth Amendment protections
to address other facets of evolving technology.
The Supreme Court has extended Fourth Amendment privacy
rights to constrain the government’s use of technology to obtain new
types of information about individuals. In Kyllo v. United States, 162 the
Court held that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to
detect heat emitted by heat lamps within a house constituted an
unconstitutional search of the home. 163 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia opined that the holding preserved the “degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted” by limiting the government’s use of a
device capable of obtaining information otherwise unascertainable
without physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area. 164 The
Court declined to find the thermal imaging constitutional merely
because it did not capture “‘intimate’ details,” refusing to partake in
seclusion” require information to be personally identifiable to establish standing),
aff’g No. Civ. 6592 (NRB), 2016 WL 5080131, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016).
161. European courts have also cultivated an emerging expectation of privacy in
browsing history. A Belgian court enjoined Facebook from tracking non-Facebook
users before they could even read its privacy policy and denoted the nonconsensual
practice as “unfair and unlawful processing of personal data” contravening “the
reasonable expectations of the non-registered user.” Rechtbanken van Eerste Aanleg
[Civ.Rb.] [Court of First Instance] Brussels, Nov. 9, 2015, Nederlandstalige
Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, 2015, 25–26, 32 (Belg.), https://www.dataprotection
authority.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/Judgement%20Belgian%2
0Privacy%20Commission%20v.%20Facebook%20-%2009-11-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2698-M53X]. Although a court of appeals later overturned the
decision against Facebook on other grounds, another Belgian court recently ruled
that Facebook again violated Belgian privacy laws by collecting and selling users’
information obtained pursuant to inadequate, if any, consent. Court of Appeals
Brussels, Feb. 16, 2018 (Nl.) (18e k.) Nr. 2016/153/A, 64 (Belg.), https://www.
dataprotectionauthority.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/Facebook_j
udgment_16022018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH8Q-W4FR] (holding that Belgian
courts did not have jurisdiction over Facebook and finding that Belgium’s claim for
injunctive relief was not urgent because Facebook had used tracking technology for
three years by the time of filing); Natasha Lomas, Facebook’s Tracking of Non-Users Ruled
Illegal Again, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/19/ facebookstracking-of-non-users-ruled-illegal-again [https://perma.cc/TL7H-SU73] (scrutinizing
Facebook’s use of tracking pixels and tracking cookies to collect browsing history).
162. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
163. See id. at 29, 34, 40 (holding unconstitutional the government’s warrantless
use of sense-enhancing technology not in general public use that allowed the
government to obtain information otherwise unascertainable without physical
trespass into a constitutionally protected area).
164. Id. at 34, 40.
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any jurisprudential odyssey to determine “which home activities are
‘intimate’ and which are not.” 165 Moreover, the Court reaffirmed that
inferences may constitute a search. 166
In Riley v. California, 167 the Supreme Court recognized that
searching a cell phone implicates privacy concerns not raised by
searching physical records and held that the search incident to arrest
doctrine does not permit warrantless searches of an individual’s
phone, including the phone’s call logs and media storage. 168 The
Court recognized an expectation of privacy in non-content
information call logs, distinguishing them from the phone numbers
in Smith on the grounds that the call logs included “identifying
information that an individual might add.” 169 Furthermore, the Court
highlighted that phones contain troves of different information that
can reconstruct an individual’s private life back to even before an
individual purchased the phone.170 The Court acknowledged that
internet-enabled phones contain “qualitatively different” information,
such as browsing history, which raise distinct privacy concerns.171
Modern technology continues to test the bounds of precedent, and in
Carpenter v. United States,172 the Court again recognized new technology
and data that “does not fit neatly under existing precedents.”173

165. See id. at 38–39 (condemning such a rule as unworkable because the
government could not discern in advance whether surveillance would capture
“intimate” information).
166. See id. at 35–37 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)) (refusing
to “leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology”). But see Orin S.
Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320 (2012)
(arguing that the “mosaic theory requires courts to apply the Fourth Amendment
search doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather than in isolated
steps”).
167. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
168. Id. at 378–80, 386, 395, 403.
169. See id. at 400 (rejecting the government’s argument that Smith v. Maryland
permits an officer to always search call logs).
170. See id. at 394–95 (citing Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010))
(highlighting that, because of the pervasiveness of phones in modern society, phones
safeguard “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [individuals’] lives—from the
mundane to the intimate”).
171. Id. at 395–96 (observing that physical records do not contain browsing history
that reveals private traits and details, such as medical well-being).
172. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
173. Id. at 2214–16 (acknowledging that historical CSLI touches upon precedent
regarding expectations of privacy in physical movement and the third-party doctrine).
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D. Carpenter v. United States
In Carpenter, police arrested several men suspected of robbing
RadioShack and T-Mobile stores. 174 After one suspect identified
Timothy Carpenter as an accomplice, prosecutors obtained a § 2703(d)
order to compel cell-providers to disclose Carpenter’s historical CSLI,
which placed his phone near the robberies.175 The district court denied
Carpenter’s motion to suppress the historical CSLI, rejecting that the
government’s warrantless acquisition of his historical CSLI constituted an
unreasonable search.176 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.177
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed “whether
the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment
when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a
comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.” 178 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the compelled
disclosure of historical CSLI constituted an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the government must
obtain a search warrant to acquire seven days or more of historical
CSLI. 179 Chief Justice Roberts noted that “requests for [CSLI] lie at
the intersection” of jurisprudence addressing a person’s expectation
of privacy in his physical movements and the third-party doctrine, and
he proceeded pursuant to this dual-pronged analysis. 180

174. Id. at 2212.
175. Id. at 2212–13 (noting that the government obtained 12,898 location points,
charting Carpenter’s movement over 127 days); see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)
(permitting the government to compel the disclosure of delineated call detail records
(CDRs) when it “offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe” that the records or information sought “are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”).
176. Order Denying Motion to Suppress at *2–3, *6, United States v. Carpenter,
No. 12-20218, 2013 WL 6385838 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2013).
177. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016).
178. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
179. See id. at 2211, 2217 n.3, 2220–21 (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to
hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”).
180. Id. at 2214–16. Chief Justice Roberts concluded his review of physical location
and movement privacy jurisprudence by acknowledging that the frameworks
employed by the majority and concurring Justices in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400 (2012), generally support that a person possesses a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his physical location and movements. Id. at 2215. Conversely, Chief Justice
Roberts concluded that Miller and Smith dictate that a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a third
party. Id. at 2216 (first citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); and then
citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
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First, the Court found that Carpenter possessed a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements. Like the GPS tracking in
Jones, the Court noted that historical CSLI is a “detailed, encyclopedic,
and effortlessly compiled” record of an individual’s every movement over
several years.181 The Court emphasized that the comprehensiveness of CSLI
provides “near perfect surveillance” that can reveal intimate details of life,
including “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations,” while circumventing practical counterbalances of government
surveillance.182 It also noted the retrospective quality of historical CSLI that
enables the government to “travel back in time” to track a person who, at
that earlier time, the government would not have known to track. The
Court denounced the retrospective tracking of any phone in the United
States since the practice is limited only by providers’ retention policies.183
The Court proceeded to reject the government’s argument that the
third-party doctrine defeated Carpenter’s expectation of privacy in
his historical CSLI. 184 The Court faulted the government for
disregarding “the seismic shifts in digital technology” that transformed
phone companies into an alert and infallible “nosy neighbor” recording
the movements of every phone in the United States—providing a
“distinct category of information” not contemplated in Smith or Miller. 185
Furthermore, the Court found that the two rationales underlying the thirdparty doctrine—a reduced expectation of privacy in information shared
with another and voluntary conveyance—do not apply to historical CSLI.186
In determining that historical CSLI is not subject to reduced
expectations of privacy, the Court evaluated the nature of the
historical CSLI to evaluate whether there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in its contents. 187 Accordingly, it distinguished the nature
of historical CSLI from the telephone call records in Smith and the
bank documents in Miller on the grounds that historical CSLI yields
incomparably revealing information.188 Moreover, the Court posited that
historical CSLI conformed to the Court’s reservation in Knotts about
pervasive tracking, asserting that the comprehensive chronicling of a

181. Id.
182. See id. at 2217–18 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring))
(comparing historical CSLI to an ankle monitor attached to all phone users).
183. Id. at 2218.
184. Id. at 2219.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2219–20.
187. Id. at 2219 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
188. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at
442).

2019]

CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND PRIVACY

2241

phone user’s movements exonerated historical CSLI from the confines of
Smith and Miller.189
Next, the Court found that cell phone users do not “voluntarily” share
historical CSLI with providers because carrying a phone is “indispensable
to participation in modern society” and users convey CSLI without any
affirmative act on their part beyond powering up the device.190 In
concluding that cell phones are integral to modern society, the Court only
cited Riley v. California, which emphasized that more than 90% of
American adults always carry their cell phone. 191 Additionally, the
Court acknowledged that there is almost “no way to avoid leaving
behind a trail of location data” because CSLI is automatically
conveyed and recorded if a phone is on. 192
Striving to not “embarrass the future,” the Court clarified that its
holding did not extend to tower dumps, security cameras,
investigative techniques used for national security or foreign affairs,
or “other business records that might incidentally reveal location
information.” 193 The Court also explicitly stated that its decision did
not overturn Smith or Miller. 194 Despite its efforts to mitigate the
doctrinal damage done, the Court left the third-party doctrine’s
longevity and application dubious and doubtful. 195 Four Justices

189. Id. at 2220; see United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983) (reserving
that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur,
there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable”).
190. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385
(2014)).
191. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395.
192. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
193. See id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944))
(cautioning that courts must “tread carefully” when considering the legal
implications arising from new technology).
194. See id. at 2220 (clarifying that it only declined to extend Smith and Miller to
historical CSLI).
195. See id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (asserting that “Smith and Miller [are] on
life support”); Paul Ohm, The Broad Reach of Carpenter v. United States, JUST SECURITY
(June 27, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58520/broad-reach-carpenter-v-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/PD96-ATDC] (claiming that the third-party doctrine is
“almost dead”). But see Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter
Decision, LAWFARE (June 22, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/understandingsupreme-courts-carpenter-decision [https://perma.cc/8NPZ-HE2M] (rejecting that
the third-party doctrine is on life support and, instead, suggesting that the third-party
doctrine merely has an “equilibrium-adjustment” cap on it); Harry Sandick & George
LoBiondo, Insight: Carpenter v. United States: An Initial Assessment, BLOOMBERG L.
(July 23, 2018), https://www.pbwt.com/content/uploads/2018/07/Carpenter-v.-
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dissented, underlining the inefficacy of the Court’s holding and
resonating that the majority disregarded property rights, thus
providing significant fodder for future Fourth Amendment
challenges. 196 However, this Comment will focus on their nonproperty-based contributions.
Beginning the trail of dissents, Justice Kennedy scrutinized the
majority for interpreting Miller and Smith as creating a balancing test
in which the privacy interests of each “‘qualitatively different
category’ of information . . . must be weighed against the fact that the
information has been disclosed to a third party.” 197 Justice Kennedy
faulted the majority for neither explaining why it adopted a seven-day
rule nor providing factors to discern whether the Court’s holding
extends beyond historical CSLI to information like browsing
history. 198 Similarly, Justice Alito doubted the utility of the Court’s
holding in a society in which private companies—not the
government—pose the greatest threats to privacy. 199 In the last
United-States-An-Initial-Assessment1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXN8-56XH] (opining that
interpreting Carpenter as nullifying the third-party doctrine would be a “stretch”).
196. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2224–26 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the Court “unhinge[d] Fourth Amendment doctrine from the property-based
concepts” delineated by Miller and Smith); id. at 2235, 2240, 2242 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (highlighting that Carpenter retained no right or property interest in the
CSLI records and esteeming the role of common law and property law when
determining Fourth Amendment privacy rights); id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(admonishing Carpenter’s counsel for omitting all property-based and positive lawbased arguments, noting that these omissions hinder “the development of a sound
or fully protective Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”).
197. See id. at 2231–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at
2216 (majority opinion)) (asserting that even if Miller and Smith established a
balancing test, a person’s privacy interest in his movements does not surmount the
third-party doctrine).
198. Id. at 2234; see also Douglas Harris, Note, Carpenter v. United States: How
Many Cell Phone Location Points Constitute a Search Under the Fourth Amendment?, 13 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 101, 115 (2018) (stating that identifying the line of
the permissible amount of historical CSLI that the government may obtain is the most
perplexing aspect of Carpenter). The Court implicitly rejected Carpenter’s proposed
twenty-four-hour rule without explaining whether or why the Court adopted the
government’s seven-day rule. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that the twenty-four-hour rule
would provide the government with the benefit of the doubt and certainty); Brief for the
United States at 55–56, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (justifying the seven-day rule
on the grounds that the government commonly surveils suspects for at least one week).
199. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quipping that
misleading the public to believe that the judiciary can protect it from private
companies that collect and misuse personal data would be divisive and disserving
compared to deferring to Congress for further legislation).
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dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch scrutinized consent as a
justification for the third-party doctrine and argued that consenting to
allow a third party to access private property does not imply consent for
the government to search the property. 200 Justice Gorsuch denounced
the consent-based explanation as merely “assumption of risk
relabeled” as “‘consent[ing]’ to whatever risks are foreseeable.” 201
E.

Where Carpenter Leaves the Fourth Amendment and Third-Party
Doctrine

Practitioners and scholars received Carpenter with mixed reviews.
While scholar Daniel Solove opined that, despite being “the length of
a Tolstoy novel,” Carpenter did not sufficiently further the legal plot, 202
other scholars esteem Carpenter as evincing the Court’s equivocal
commitment to the third-party doctrine. 203 Indeed, at face value,
Carpenter only yields that the government must obtain a search warrant
before acquiring more than seven days of historical CSLI. 204 However,
despite the Court’s limited holding, its reliance on comprehensive
detail, pervasiveness, and involuntary conveyance suggests that the
scope of Carpenter applies to information other than historical CSLI. 205
200. Id. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch also rejected that
“knowledge” or “clarity” justify the third-party doctrine. Id. at 2263–64.
201. Id. at 2263.
202. Daniel Solove, Carpenter v. United States, Cell Phone Location Records, and the
Third Party Doctrine, TEACH PRIVACY (July 1, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/
carpenter-v-united-states-cell-phone-location-records-and-the-third-party-doctrine
[https://perma.cc/5WCE-8R7B] (asserting that “a lot more was at stake in
[Carpenter]” than the Court’s narrow holding addresses). Solove argues that the
Court squandered “the prime opportunity” to overrule the third-party doctrine. Id.
203. See Nat’l Constitution Ctr., Does the Warrantless Search and Seizure of Cellphone
Records Violate the Fourth Amendment, YOUTUBE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=hW32k7x7zE0 [https://perma.cc/2BAS-AANW] (noting that
the Court in Knotts indicated that it is not fully wedded to the third-party doctrine by
reserving whether the public view doctrine permits the government to conduct
dragnet surveillance of Americans using technology).
204. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3 (majority opinion).
205. See Kate Fazzini, Supreme Court Ruling Requiring Warrant for Cellphone Searches
Could Lead to a Flood of Lawsuits, CNBC (June 25, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/06/25/privacy-scotus-cell-data-carpenter-v-usa.html [https://perma.cc/BCE6M54X] (forecasting that Carpenter will force courts to address whether real-time CSLI
should be treated differently than historical CSLI); Sharon Bradford Franklin,
Carpenter and the End of Bulk Surveillance of Americans, LAWFARE (July 25, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/carpenter-and-end-bulk-surveillance-americans
[https://perma.cc/9B82-DMG2] (advocating that Carpenter could be extended to nonlocation-based CDRs); see also Timothy Edgar, The Supreme Court Just Struck a Blow Against Mass
Surveillance, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/the-
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Some courts have already grappled with applying Carpenter in nonhistorical CSLI cases.206 Most notably, in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness
v. City of Naperville, 207 the Seventh Circuit extended Carpenter to “smart
meter” energy data, holding that the government conducted a search
when it required residents to purchase energy from it and
subsequently recorded their energy consumption every fifteen
minutes.208 In rejecting that the third-party doctrine defeated residents’
expectation of privacy in their smart meter data merely because they
“enter[ed] into a ‘voluntary relationship’ to purchase electricity from the
city,”209 the court invoked Carpenter to dispel that a resident “assume[s]
the risk of near constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in
her home.”210 Furthermore, the court viewed the smart meter data as
potentially more invasive than the thermal imaging data collected in
Kyllo because the comprehensiveness of the smart meter data enables
the government to infer more confidently the interior details of the
home. 211 Naperville exemplifies the reality that the third-party
doctrine must be reconsidered in the digital age. 212 As technology
increasingly integrates into modern society, perpetuating a rigid and
supreme-court-just-struck-a-blow-against-mass-surveillance/2018/06/25/1b5ee510-7653-11e8b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/ E4FE-MA2C] (noting that Carpenter raises
serious issues for mass surveillance of telephone metadata).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2019) (refusing to
extend Carpenter to IP addresses); Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of
Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding the third-party doctrine
inapplicable to digital “smart meter” energy data); Florida v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d.
986, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (holding unconstitutional warrantless direct
government surveillance of real-time CSLI); Mobley v. Georgia, 816 S.E.2d 769, 776–
77 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in airbag control module data).
207. 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018).
208. Id. at 527–29 (holding that the government conducted a search but,
nevertheless, concluding that the search was reasonable because, inter alia, the
government’s public utility workers—not law enforcement officials—conducted the
search and without prosecutorial intent).
209. Id. at 527.
210. See id. (extrapolating that, if an individual does not “voluntarily ‘assume the
risk’” of conveying CSLI, a homeowner does not voluntarily assume the risk of
surveillance merely by having electricity).
211. See id. at 526 (distinguishing that, unlike the search in Kyllo that revealed only
heat, the smart meter data can reveal when individuals are sleeping, eating, or
vacationing).
212. See id. at 527 (holding that people do not surrender their legitimate
expectations of privacy by choosing to have government supplied electricity in their
homes); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (submitting that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age”
and merits reconsideration).
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unqualified third-party doctrine guarantees increasingly intrusive,
“absurd and problematic” government surveillance. 213
III. APPLYING CARPENTER TO BROWSING HISTORY COLLECTED BY
TRACKING COOKIES
The holding in Carpenter provides new fodder to establish an
expectation of privacy in browsing history collected by tracking
cookies. Part III applies Carpenter’s holding to browsing history
collected by tracking cookies, advocating that courts should recognize
an expectation of privacy in browsing history. First, Part III.A.1
advances an expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of the
information sought, thus affording browsing history heightened
Fourth Amendment protections. Next, Parts III.A.2–3 argue that the
justifications for the third-party doctrine do not apply to browsing
history collected by tracking cookies. Finally, Part III.B asserts that a
reconceptualized third-party doctrine should protect the private
sector from government appropriation.
A. An Expectation of Privacy in the Comprehensiveness of the Information
Sought
The first step in extending Carpenter to browsing history collected by
tracking cookies is recognizing an expectation of privacy in it. Although
the United States has yet to recognize an absolute expectation of privacy
in browsing history or against tracking cookies, recent technologyoriented Fourth Amendment jurisprudence supports an expectation
of privacy in browsing history based on the comprehensiveness of the
information sought. In construing Carpenter to turn on the
comprehensiveness of the information sought, rather than the type
of information, Carpenter provides a foundation to strengthen privacy
rights in the digital age.
In forging an expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of
the information sought, the concurring opinions of Justices
Sotomayor and Alito in Jones take center stage, relegating back to
understudy Justice Scalia’s trespass approach. 214 In his concurrence,
213. See Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment
Limits of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1924–26 (2018) (illustrating
the unreasonableness of applying the third-party doctrine to information obtained
from a smart home).
214. See supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text (summarizing the concurring
opinions of Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor in Jones). The Jones majority opinion,
relying primarily upon trespass-based privacy rights, lends little support here because
the Carpenter majority couches its opinion in “reasonable expectation of privacy”
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Justice Alito posits that long-term monitoring would infringe society’s
expectation of privacy that the government would not and could not
“secretly monitor and catalogue” an individual’s every movement. 215
However, Justice Alito left unanswered a fundamental question: Why
does society expect that the government does not and will not covertly
and comprehensively monitor an individual’s every movement? Justice
Sotomayor answers this question, expounding that comprehensive
tracking threatens to expose the very personal details and “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” at the heart of
even the earliest notions of privacy.216 Privacy does not concern general,
uncontextualized location information; rather, it concerns the precise
collection and aggregation of private, detailed information that an
individual might not have otherwise disclosed and that no single
record could have otherwise revealed. 217
terms. Compare Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–16 (2018) (noting
that Carpenter lies at the intersection of expectations of privacy in physical location
and movements and the third-party doctrine’s limitation of those expectations), with
id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court majority of “unhing[ing]
the Fourth Amendment doctrine” from its property-based foundation), and United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2011) (holding that the government physically
trespassed on the defendant’s vehicle when it installed a GPS device on the
defendant’s car and, therefore, conducted a search). Furthermore, as noted by both
Justices Alito and Sotomayor in Jones, the government can easily circumvent privacy
rights grounded in property law if it uses technology to track individuals without
physical trespass. Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 425–26
(Alito, J., concurring).
215. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
216. See id. at 415–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing New York v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)) (questioning the reasonableness of “permeating
police surveillance” that reveals this information which can be misused and subjected
to associational and expressive chilling) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581, 595 (1948)); supra note 60 and accompanying text (recalling that privacy in
colonial America safeguarded personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation,
and interpersonal communications, as well as the personal liberties inherently
flowing from each).
217. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (observing that the vast
storage capacities of digital records implicates distinct privacy concerns compared to
the limited information within a physical record); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34–35 (2001) (holding that the government’s use of sense-enhancing technology not
in general public use that allowed the government to obtain, or infer, information
otherwise unascertainable without physical trespass into a constitutionally protected
area constituted a search and explaining that its holding preserves the “degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”);
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”); WESTIN, supra note 59 and accompanying text (defining privacy
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”).
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Chief Justice Roberts also supports this expectation of privacy in
Carpenter when he clarified that the majority’s holding turns not upon
use of a phone or an individual’s movements but on the “detailed
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every
moment, over several years.” 218 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s
application of Carpenter in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of
Naperville also supports this expectation of privacy. As observed by
one commentator, the government in Naperville supplied its residents
with the energy and, therefore, already knew how much energy the
homes used.219 However, the government’s comprehensive recording
and saving of residents’ energy usage in short intervals, which enabled
the government to infer private details about residents, led the court to
hold that the exfiltration of the energy use data constituted a search. 220
Moreover, this expectation of privacy in comprehensiveness also
accounts for the “seismic shifts in digital technology” that permit the
government to track not only a specific internet user, but also to
retrospectively track any internet user. 221
Admittedly, an expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of
the information sought, and as applied to browsing history, is prone
to criticisms posited by the dissenting Justices in Carpenter. The
expectation of privacy would likely require a bright line rule, like
Carpenter’s seven-day rule, to identify “comprehensive” information
requiring a warrant.222 However, as Justice Kennedy noted about
historical CSLI, there is little reason seven days should demarcate
requiring a warrant versus less demanding forms of compelled process.223
218. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (adding that “[s]uch a chronicle” transcends
the scope of the privacy interests concerned in Smith and Miller).
219. Orin Kerr, Public Utility’s Recording of Home Energy Consumption Every 15 Minutes
Is a “Search,” Seventh Circuit Rules, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 17, 2018), http://
reason.com/volokh/2018/08/17/public-utilitys-recording-of-home-energy
[https://perma.cc/5CNL-35F3].
220. Id.
221. Compare Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (noting that technological advancements
transformed phone companies into an alert and infallible “nosy neighbor,” recording
the movements of every phone), with Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of
Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2018) (condemning the recording and storage
of smart meter energy data every fifteen minutes, which the government could
retrospectively mine to infer more confidently details of a home’s interior).
222. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that the Carpenter Court
adopted a seven-day rule after the government proposed a seven-day rule and
Carpenter proposed a twenty-four-hour rule).
223. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2233–34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (scrutinizing the
majority opinion for employing an arbitrary seven-day rule while failing to consider
the reality of law enforcement investigations).
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Thus, the central question becomes, “what makes information, or
browsing history, comprehensive?” Is it the amount of datapoints and
their accuracy, or is it the interval at which they are collected?224
Regardless of the final metric, the efficacy of this expectation of privacy is
that it jettisons the nuanced, and oftentimes technical, analyses requiring
courts to distinguish between “intimate” and “non-intimate”225 or “content”
and “non-content.”226 Departing from an “intimacy” inquiry extends
privacy protections to information that an internet user may view as private
but which may not qualify as “intimate.”227 Additionally, this broader
expectation of privacy does not depend upon the nuances of the “content”
dichotomy that has only acknowledged privacy interests when a URL
contained an internet user’s search terms.228 Just as the Court refused to
make an expectation of privacy depend upon a company’s decision to
automate its processes, an expectation of privacy in browsing history can no
more justifiably turn on whether a URL is programmed to include a search
term.229 Exonerated from the confines of “intimacy” and “content”
inquiries, this expectation of privacy protects browsing history,
regardless of whether it reveals support group webpages or social media

224. See id. at 2212 (majority opinion) (highlighting that the government collected
more than 12,000 datapoints that could locate an individual within fifty meters);
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, 900 F.3d at 525–27 (focusing on how the collection
of data every fifteen minutes allowed the government to infer more confidently
details of a home’s interior); Harris, supra note 198 (noting that the identification of
the permissible amount of historical CSLI that the government may obtain as the
most perplexing aspect of Carpenter).
225. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38–39 (2001) (rejecting a bright-line
rule based on intimacy as unworkable for courts who would be required to determine
which activities are “intimate”).
226. See supra Section II.C.2 (detailing the fine distinctions between “content” and
“non-content” under the SCA).
227. See Solove, supra note 64, at 755 (illustrating how defining privacy through
“intimacy” may exclude privacy interests in information such as political affiliations
and religious beliefs that may be regarded as private but not intimate).
228. See supra notes 138–46 and accompanying text (surveying the technical
nuances governing the expectation of privacy in URLs).
229. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (“We are not inclined to make
a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment” where “the pattern of protection would be
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation”).
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games,230 simply because browsing history reveals comprehensive
information about internet users.231
If courts recognize an expectation of privacy in browsing history
based on comprehensiveness, courts must then address whether the
third-party doctrine eliminates an internet user’s expectation of privacy
when tracking cookies collect browsing history. Parts III.B.1–2 argue that
the rationales underlying the third-party doctrine—reduced expectation of
privacy in information knowingly shared and voluntary exposure—do not
apply to browsing history collected by tracking cookies; therefore, the
third-party doctrine does not eliminate internet users’ expectation of
privacy in their browsing history.
B. The Third-Party Doctrine Does Not Apply to Browsing History
1.

Browsing history is subject to a heightened expectation of privacy
Browsing history collected by tracking cookies is not subject to a
reduced expectation of privacy because it is a comprehensive and
pervasive record of an internet user’s online behavior. Tracking
cookies, like historical CSLI, have outgrown the confines delineated
by Miller and Smith that have failed to accommodate new, “distinct
categor[ies] of information” born from “the seismic shifts in digital
technology.” 232 In Carpenter, the Court found that historical CSLI
conveyed troves of intimate information not found in the negotiable
230. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37–39 (declining to hold that privacy rights depend on
the intimacy of the information sought, condemning such a rule as unworkable); In
re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to find an
expectation of privacy based on the contents of a webpage because the IP address
constituted only “addressing information” and the website URLs did not contain
search terms).
231. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (questioning the reasonableness of “permeating police surveillance”
that reveals information which can be misused and subjected to associational and
expressive chilling) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)) (citing
New York v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 40
(holding unconstitutional technology that allowed the government to obtain
information about the interior of homes that was otherwise unascertainable without
physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area); Naperville Smart Meter
Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2018) (viewing smart
meter data as potentially more invasive than the thermal imaging data collected in
Kyllo because the comprehensiveness of the smart meter data enables the
government to more confidently infer the interior details of a home); supra notes 42–
45 (discussing that browsing history is used to determine information about an
internet user, such as political and religious beliefs, sex, and occupation, otherwise
unavailable on the internet).
232. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2216, 2219 (2018).
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bank documents in Miller or telephone numbers in Smith, which without
more, “reveal[ed] little in the way of ‘identifying information.’” 233
Similarly, although cookies may have conceptually originated as mere
tools to help a well-intentioned shopkeeper remember and relate to
customers, today’s tracking cookies embody a “nosy” shopkeeper who
alertly and infallibly records his customers’ browsing history to ensure
that his shelves are always stocked with products matching each
customer’s interests, associations, and beliefs. 234
The comprehensiveness of browsing history dispels any reduced
expectation of privacy and supports a heightened expectation of
privacy. Browsing history, like the historical CSLI in Carpenter and GPS
monitoring in Jones, can reveal personal details of life, including “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”235 Similarly, like
historical CSLI, tracking cookies generate a “detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled” record of internet users’ browsing history for several
years.236 Accordingly, browsing history implicates the retrospective
tracking that Chief Justice Roberts denounced in Carpenter regarding
historical CSLI and in Riley regarding information in cell phones, such as
browsing history, that provide glimpses into users’ pasts.237
However, unlike the government’s collection of historical CSLI, which
a phone company can limit through its data retention policy, or
information on a cell phone that a user may delete, companies who use
cookies can mine them for years without limitation.238 Most internet users
233. Id. (first quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); and then
quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–93 (2014)) (citing United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)) (distinguishing that Miller and Smith involved
“limited types of personal information”).
234. See id. (likening telephone providers collecting historical CSLI to an alert and
infallible “nosy neighbor”); supra notes 32 & 33 (detailing how cookies evolved from
tools that enhanced e-commerce sites’ customer relations to tools that help sell the
customers).
235. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Jones, 565
U.S. at 430); see supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (highlighting that third
parties use browsing history to deduce information that an internet user may not have
shared on the internet).
236. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216, 2218 (concluding that historical CSLI
generates more invasive records than the GPS device in Jones).
237. See id. (observing that historical CSLI allows the government to “travel back
in time” to reconstruct an individual’s movements); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489
(recognizing that a phone may contain information “dat[ing]to the purchase of the
phone, or even earlier”).
238. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (noting that phone companies retain historical
CSLI for approximately five years); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486 (addressing concerns
about phone users deleting information contained in a phone through remotewiping or limiting access through encryption); GOOGLE GUIDE: MAKING SEARCHING
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alone cannot stop a tracking cookie from recording their browsing
history.239 Even if an internet user requests for a third party to delete its
tracking and Flash cookies, third parties are not legally obligated to comply
in many instances.240 Moreover, tracking cookies may raise greater privacy
concerns than historical CSLI as new technology derives more information
from browsing history.241
2.

Browsing history is not voluntarily conveyed by tracking cookies
Tracking cookies do not voluntarily convey browsing history to
third parties because using the internet is integral to modern society
and browsing history is collected without any affirmative action on behalf
of the user. Like cell phones, using the internet has become a “pervasive
and insistent part of daily life.”242 Comparable to the 90% of American
adults who always carry their cell phone,243 89% of Americans use the
internet and 26% of Americans are “almost constantly” on the internet.244

EVEN EASIER, www.googleguide.com/cookies.html [https://perma.cc/S6YM-MU6E]
(explaining that cookies can last anywhere from a few minutes to up to years in the future).
239. See SOLTANI ET AL., supra note 49, at 158 (explaining that erasing a browser’s
cookies, cache, search history, and private data will not delete Flash cookies).
240. E.g., supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (noting that companies are
only legally obligated to fulfill “Do Not Track” requests if the company commits to
honoring them). Compare, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Oct. 25,
2017,
6
Ob
116/17b,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_
20171025_OGH0002_0060OB00116_17B0000_000/JJT_20171025_OGH0002_0060OB
00116_17B0000_000.html [https://perma.cc/V4NL-WAK5] (refusing to interpret the
“right to be forgotten” as requiring Facebook to proactively delete content similar to
content that an individual requested be deleted), with Data Policy: How Can I Manage Or
Delete Information About Me?, FACEBOOK, https:// www.facebook.com/about/privacy
[https://perma.cc/F9HP-UBWL] (stating that Facebook retains user data “until it is
no longer necessary to provide our services and Facebook Products or until your
account is deleted—whichever comes first”).
241. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 526–
27 (7th Cir. 2018) (voicing that the smart meter data raised greater privacy concerns
than the thermal imaging in Kyllo because smart meter data allowed the government
to more confidently deduce intimate details of the home); see also Carpenter, 138 S.
Ct. at 2218–19 (concluding that, despite historical CSLI being less accurate than GPS
monitoring, GPS monitoring jurisprudence governed it because the Court must, as
stated in Kyllo, consider “more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001))).
242. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).
243. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
244. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, tracking cookies set and convey browsing history without
any affirmative act on behalf of the user.245 For example, the pervasive
Facebook “Like” button embedded on a non-Facebook website sets and
reads tracking cookies in an internet user’s computer without the user
ever visiting the Facebook website.246 Labeling such tracking as
“voluntary” is problematic because an internet user may not know that a
non-Facebook website features a Facebook “Like” button before visiting
the website.247 Moreover, as using the internet becomes increasingly
central to modern society, individuals do not “voluntarily” assume the
risk of surveillance through tracking cookies merely because they
choose to access the internet. 248
Moreover, internet users do not voluntarily convey their browsing
history collected by tracking cookies because internet users cannot
effectively manage or control the sharing of their information.
Companies intentionally implement privacy practices, such as the use
of Flash cookies and non-compliance with “Do Not Track” requests,
that nullify internet users’ control over their information online. 249
Additionally, internet users do not give meaningful consent when
agreeing to a website’s cookie policy. Even if an astute internet user
reads a website’s privacy policy before agreeing to it, most privacy
245. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (recognizing that cell phones automatically
record historical CSLI, without any affirmative act from users other than turning on
their cell phone).
246. See Gillmore, supra note 39 (noting that tracking cookies embedded in
Facebook “Like” buttons on other websites enable Facebook to identify the website
on which users found the “Like” button and to track their browsing history).
247. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (recalling that voluntary
conveyance requires that a conveyance be intentional and presumably with the
conveyor’s knowledge). Additionally, European courts have rejected such tracking
as “voluntary,” decrying the practices as “unfair and unlawful” in violation of the
“reasonable expectations of the non-registered user.” See supra note 161 (detailing
how European courts have addressed tracking cookies).
248. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(decrying that a person cannot assume a risk where “unless a person is prepared to
forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he
cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance”); Naperville Smart Meter Awareness
v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting that individuals, by
ascertaining a common utility in their homes, “assume the risk of near constant
monitoring”); Bellovin et al., supra note 107, at 1, 28–31 (rejecting that information
that must be disclosed to use a service is necessarily “voluntarily conveyed”).
249. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (noting the strategic use of
Flash cookies and non-compliance with “Do Not Track” requests to perpetuate online
tracking, even after internet users attempt to stop it); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 749–
50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubting that one can assume a risk without any
reasonable alternative).
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policies do not sufficiently disclose how the user’s information,
including browsing history, will be tracked and conveyed to third
parties. 250 As Justice Gorsuch noted in his Carpenter dissent, consent
cannot be dispositive in the third-party doctrine because the doctrine
then merely equates to agreeing to “whatever risks are foreseeable.” 251
In the digital age, allowing the third-party doctrine to turn on
consent, and thus foreseeability, effectively turns consent into a
boilerplate, “formalistic exercise[],” that empowers the government
to define internet users’ expectations of privacy by legislating that
certain notices be provided to users in privacy policies. 252
Considering that internet users are unable to negotiate the terms of
privacy policies, a modern privacy framework in which the third-party
doctrine can turn on consent when an internet user “[has] no realistic
alternative” but to submit to surveillance or to forgo technology
essential to modern life only furtherly imbalances the equilibrium of
privacy rights and bargaining power online. 253
C. Recommendation: Returning to a Misplaced Trust Third-Party Doctrine
In his dissenting opinion in Carpenter, Justice Alito recognized that,
“today . . . some of the greatest threats to individual privacy may
come” not from the government but “from powerful private
companies,” and that Carpenter would not protect the public from
“this looming threat.” 254 While he may have correctly identified that
private companies now “collect and sometimes misuse vast quantities of
data about the lives of ordinary Americans,” Justice Alito understates the
threat that the federal government still poses in this paradigm.255
250. See LIBERT, supra note 54, at 212 (illustrating that website privacy policies
disparately disclose the conveyance of user information to certain third parties while
omitting the conveyance to other discreet third parties).
251. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2263 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
252. See Hartzog, supra note 109 (noting that the formalization of consent
threatens its integrity); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the proper framework for determining what risks individuals assume is
based on the “risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society”).
253. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 749–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubting that an
individual assumes the risk of being surveilled where the individual must choose
between forgoing an important service or being surveilled); Kerr, supra note 195
(positing that Carpenter placed an “equilibrium-adjustment” cap on the third-party
doctrine’s application to historical CSLI).
254. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Solove, supra note 80, at
1092 (arguing that “the Internet has the potential to become one of the
government’s greatest information gathering tools”).
255. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Under the current third-party doctrine, the government views all
persons and entities as prospective undercover agents or informants
because the law requires only a subpoena or court order to compel
them to disclose internet users’ browsing history. 256 The current legal
framework, encompassing the Fourth Amendment, third-party
doctrine, and SCA do not reflect societal expectations that companies
are not just repositories but also fiduciaries. 257 The law must
recognize the distinction between the private and public sector—that
not every person and entity is an informant or undercover agent—
and must continue to evolve to regulate the conveyance of private
individuals’ information to the government. 258 Thus, the third-party
doctrine has strayed too far from its misplaced trust doctrinal roots to
apply the third-party doctrine in the digital age. Courts should
reform the third-party doctrine to adapt and promote the
information practices of the digital age.
A reconceptualized third-party doctrine should recognize the
absence of retrospective surveillance in most misplaced trust cases
and require the government to obtain a warrant when the
government seeks to acquire information voluntarily conveyed to a
third party not employed or associated with the government when the
information was originally conveyed. Generally, in misplaced trust
doctrine jurisprudence an informant or undercover agent conveyed
the defendants’ “private” information to the government. 259
However, more narrowly, these informants and undercover agents
were typically already current government employees or associates. 260
These cases did not involve the government constructively employing
or appropriating an individual or entity to disclose retrospective
information that they would not have agreed to disclose at the time
of the original conveyance. A reconceptualized doctrine need not
question the principles of Hoffa and White, in which the conveyors
256. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text (delineating the various
compulsory process means through which the government can obtain browsing history).
257. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
611, 617, 619–20 (2015) (arguing that Smith and Miller are the progeny of conflating the
disclosure of information to a company and the exposure of information to the public).
258. See Solove, supra note 80, at 1086–87 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
must provide new protections to protect citizens from the “digital biographies” held
by third parties).
259. See supra Section II.B.1 (chronicling the development of the misplaced trust
doctrine).
260. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 428 (1963) (involving a thenemployed IRS agent); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952) (involving
an undercover agent already working for the government).
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voluntarily disclosed the information to the government despite not
being associated with the government when the information was
originally conveyed, because individuals and entities should be free
to voluntarily convey information to the government to promote
effective law enforcement. 261
Furthermore, a more restrained third-party doctrine that recognizes
that an individual does not relinquish all expectations of privacy in
comprehensive browsing history disclosed to a third party mitigates the
burden on companies to defend the rights of internet users. As legal
reforms diminish internet users’ expectations of privacy, private
companies have emerged as the only party positioned to advocate for
users’ privacy rights.262 However, companies may be unwilling or unable
to challenge infringements upon users’ privacy,263 marring the frontiers
of data privacy law with barren plains in which “there is no one who is
both in the position and legally entitled to challenge the search or
seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds . . . thus eliminating one of the
most powerful checks on government overreach.”264 If internet users
possess a cognizable expectation of privacy in their browsing history,
they can challenge these government searches, consequently
alleviating the vigilante burden on companies and helping to restore
the equilibrium between internet users and the government. 265
American society continues to adopt evolving technology, and a
third-party doctrine that does not adapt to these changes promises to
fundamentally change the relations between citizens, companies, and

261. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47, 747 n.1 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (involving an informant; however, the Court declined to determine
whether his employ was consensual); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295 (1966)
(involving a witness who conveyed the defendant’s incriminatory statements to the
government).
262. See, e.g., Letter from Tim Cook, CEO, Apple Inc., to Apple Customers, (Feb.
16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/customer-letter [https://perma.cc/ML3S-HEF2]
(reaffirming Apple’s refusal to help the government circumvent its encryption
safeguards because doing so would effectively compromise its customers’ information
privacy and security); see also Kyriades, supra note 9 (criticizing the European Union’s eEvidence proposal, which would allow European Union member states to circumvent
prolonged judicial processes and to obtain digital evidence directly from service
providers, as delegating the vindication of individuals’ rights to private companies).
263. Supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the legal and practical
restraints that hinder the vindication of privacy rights).
264. Daskal, supra note 9, at 441 (emphasis omitted).
265. See Kerr, supra note 195 (viewing sea changes in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as “equilibrium adjustments”).
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government. 266 A third-party doctrine that distinguishes between data
voluntarily conveyed, as opposed to data retrospectively obtained
through the compulsion of private individuals and entities, affords
privacy protections that promote trust and progress in information
relationships between the private and public sectors. 267
CONCLUSION
Although Carpenter v. United States represents a positive step toward
strengthening privacy rights in the digital age, its holding must be
extended to other digital information to adequately safeguard privacy.
Currently, databases of profiles of internet users serve as “one-stop
shops” for the government to fish for suspects—with nothing in its
tacklebox except undemanding forms of process. However, Carpenter
and other technology-oriented Fourth Amendment cases support an
emerging expectation of privacy in the comprehensiveness of digital
information that could remedy this privacy concern by extending
Carpenter’s heightened Fourth Amendment protections to browsing
history collected by tracking cookies. Like historical CSLI, tracking cookies
involuntarily, comprehensively, and infallibly record browsing history that
reveals, directly or indirectly, details about internet users; therefore, the
third-party doctrine does not apply to browsing history collected by
tracking cookies.
Extending Carpenter to browsing history collected by tracking cookies
pioneers more than merely granting internet users additional privacy
rights. It also forges order in the Wild West of the internet where
legislation and regulation have consistently lagged behind advancing
technology, neglecting the government’s gradual appropriation of
private entities. Therefore, courts and privacy advocates should
interpret Carpenter beyond its four-corners to reclaim an equitable
stake in the digital age privacy landscape.
266. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (advancing that such unchecked surveillance could “chill[] associational
and expressive freedoms” and “alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society” (quoting United States v.
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))); White, 401
U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (voicing that third-party surveillance must be
viewed as “undermin[ing] that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one
another that is characteristic of individual relationships between citizens in a free
society”).
267. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 434 (2016) (advocating that privacy laws should
strengthen and foster trust in information relationships but commentating that
modern privacy laws do not).

